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The study examines national interest theory in the light of
the INF controversy. The perceptions and positions of the United
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non-nuclear members of NATO are examined and analyzed. The
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considerations, military capabilities, and domestic political
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 12 December 1979 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) adopted a "twin-track" approach of upgrading the
alliance's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe,
while simultaneously seeking a negotiated resolution to the
imbalance in such forces, which was perceived by the alliance as
being precipitated by Soviet deployment of new INF systems. The
decision was predicated on two factors, one repeatedly cited as a
major reason for the decision, "credibility", the second one more
implicit, "stability". It was properly concluded that, if the
alliance wished to maintain its short term credibililty and its
long term stability, a response, that was potent in its own right
and yet insufficient to pose an independent offensive nuclear
threat to the Soviet Union, was required.
To understand why the December 1979 NATO decision was the
proper one, one must understand the historical backdrop,
especially with respect to nuclear weapons in general and nuclear
systems in Europe in particular, as well as the current setting
and how these impacted upon the national interests of the various
states involved. But before the details of the INF controversy
are addressed, thereby enabling an assessment of the December
1979 NATO decision and a prognosis concerning I NF ' s future, the
broad and often misunderstood term, the national interest, needs
to be defined as it will be applied in the analysis.
12
This analysis will, therefore, review: 1) the basic concepts
or precepts that strongly influence, if not determine, a state's
national interests, 2) what the perspectives, needs and positions
are of the various states involved in the INF controversy, 3)
(where it is pertinent) the evolution of those positions, 4) how,
in the case of some states involved in the INF controversy, the
national interests are significantly impacted by domestic
considerations, 5) the h isto ry of nuclear capabilities in Europe,
and 6) the capabilities of the INF systems in question and how
they fit within the context of the overall nuclear capabilities
of the various states involved. The mil ita ry usefulness of the
systems involved in INF are clearly not the sole consideration of
the states involved--for many not even the primary consideration.
To fully comprehend this one must acquire an understanding of the
perceptual and cognitive origins of the diverse state interests
involved in the INF controversy, which lie in the early post
Worl d Wa r II years .
The INF controversy cannot, therefore, be viewed in
isolation. It must be seen in the context of the larger,
overarching confrontation, at various levels, that has and
continues to go on continuously between the two superpowers, the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
This jockeying takes on special significance in Europe.
The Soviet Union by most assessments is extremely concerned
about its own security. In light of this it has sought and
maintained in the post World War II period buffer states on its
13
periphery. The nations of Eastern Europe are the most prominent
manifestation. But the Soviets have also shown a desire and a
capacity to expand its influence and sway beyond those areas
contiguous with its border when such can be accomplished with a
minimum of risk and expense.
The US, on the other hand, has displayed those traits most
often associated with a status quo power, particularly in opting
for a strategic defensive posture (i.e., containment) vis a vis
the Soviet Union. Key elements to the world stability, as we
know it today, are the Western European democracies. It is,
therefore, central to US policy that Western Europe remain not
only free from Soviet domination, but also Soviet intimidation.
Western Europe, although linked to the US militarily through
NATO, is a grouping of independent, sovereign states. NATO,
therefore, is a complex grouping of nations, that have evolved
certain roles within the alliance which are based upon not only
the magnitude of the threat from the Soviet Union, but also upon
its proximity (temporally and spacially), as well as such things
as geography, economics, and domestic political relationships and
structures .
As all this would indicate, the number of weapons decided
upon, 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles
(GLCMs), was more of a political, than a military decision and
took into account conflicting NATO goals. The European members
of NATO are torn between two phobias: a fear the United States
(US) will not display leadership and resolve, while also being
14
alternately concerned by what Europeans perceive as an occasional
lack of restraint on the US's part. They want a strong US, but
not one that will drag them into a military conflict. A similar
conflict exists in European recognition of the need for a strong
defense, without undue financial demands, but not a defense that
will be seen as threatening to the Soviet Union. To properly
assess how NATO approached these conflicting goals and begin to
comprehend Soviet concerns requires an understanding of national
interestconcepts.
15
II. lATIONAL INTEREST THEORY
A. WHAT THE TERM NATIONAL INTEREST IS MEANT TO CONVEY
The "national interests" of a state are addressed by its
external policies^ as opposed to its internal policies, which, in
the case of a democracy, such as the US, are couched in terms of
the "public interest". This categorization of external concerns
being part of a state's national interest is a generally accepted
concept.!.
In virtually all works analyzing this subject, a second
broadly accepted principle, the concept of the actual survival of
the state, is considered in the national interest.^ It is
generally accepted that any subject or incident that threatens
this survival clearly falls in the category of the national
interest. The definition of what specifically constitutes a
threat to that survival varies from analyst to analyst. Donald
Nuechterlein says that it is a threat to "the yery existence of
^ee Donald E. Nuechterlein, "The Concept of 'National
Interest': A Time for New Approaches," r b i s 23 (Spring 1979):
76; and Glendon Schubert, The Publ i c In teres t (Glencoe, Illinois:




^See Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept
of the National Interest: Uses and Limitations," in Commission
on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy, Appendices
,
vol. 2, pp. 67-68, cited in Fred A.
Sonde rmann, "The Concept of the National Interest," r b i s 21
(Spring 1977): 16-23; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great
Debate': The National Interest of the United States," The
American Pol i tical Science Review (December 1952): 973, cited in
Fred A. Sonde rmann, "The Concept of the National Interest," r b i s
21 (Spring 1977): 16-23; and Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self -
Interests in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago! Univeristy of
16
the nation state . . . either as a result of overt military
attack on its territory or from the imminent threat of attack* . . ."
B. NUECHTERLEIN'S NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX
Nuech terl ei n ' s approach to the evaluation of a state's
national interest is i ncapsul a ted in his national interest
matrix^ see Table 1 on the following page. He lists four
fundamental interests of national foreign policy: 1) defense, 2)
economic, 3) world order, and 4) ideological [See Appendix A for
definitions]. These categories correspond very closely to those
identified by John Chase. ^ Other analysts have identified these
same interests to varying degrees and in somewhat different
formats.^ Nuech terl ei n ' s categorization of interests should not,
therefore, be viewed as all encompassing or definitive, but as
highly representative of work in this field.
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 10, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The
Concept of the National Interest," r b i s 21 (Spring 1977):
16-23.
^Nuechterlein, 79.
^The four categories or aspects of US national interest that
Chase suggested "'actually guided and motivated the development
of our foreign policy' [were]: (1) to deprive potential
aggressors of bases from which they might launch attacks against
the United States; (2) to support self-government and democracy
abroad; (3) to protect and advance commerce; and (4) to help
establish and maintain a favorable world balance of power." John
L. Chase, "Defining the National Interest of the United States,"
Journal of Politics (November 1956): 720-724, cited in Fred A.
Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," r b i s 21
(Spring 1977): 16-23.
^See Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of
the National Interest: Uses and Limitations in Commission on
the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy, Appendices
,
vol. 2, pp. 67-68, cited in Fred A.
Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," r b i s 21
(Spring 1977): 16-23; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great
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TABLE I
UECHTERLEIN'S NATI ONAL- I NTEREST MATRIX^
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest







• •• ••• ««• •••
• •• ••• ••• •••
• •• ••• ••• •••
• •• ••• ••• •••
The usefulness of Nuechterl ei n ' s work is that it goes further
then the mere categorization of interests; in it he defines
categories of intensity: 1) survival issues, 2) vital issues, 3)
major issues, and 4) peripheral issues [See Appendix A for
definitions]. The ranking of these intensities enables the
decision-maker or analyst utilizing his matrix to move beyond the
nominal measurement characteri sti sc of interest categories alone.
Although, it does not allow for a finite discernment of how much
greater one level is compared to another, it does provide a means
for identifying varying levels of concern, by different actors,
within the same interest category, concerning the same topic--a
sfery useful tool.
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF NUECHTERLEIN
Unfortunately, Nuechterl ei n ' s matrix does not incorporate
other important variables, such as the acceptance of a state's
Debate': The National Interest of the United States," The
American Political Science Review (December 1952): 973, cited in
Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," r b i s
21 (Spring 1977): 16-23; and Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self -
Interests in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 10, "cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The
Concept of the National Interest," r b i s 21 (Sprina 1977): 16-23
^Nuechterlein, 75.
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proposed policy by either the populace of a state, particularly
important in a democracy, or other elements of the country's
elite, which may not have been privy to the decision-making
process (i.e., in the US, the Congress; in the Soviet Union, the
nomenklatura, in other countries, possibly the military).
Nuechterlein does acknowledge the need to consider such
variables, which he listed as "Value Factors" and "Cost/Risk
Factors", see Table II. But Nuechterlein fails to provide or
suggest a mechanism by which these concerns might be factored
into his matrix and, thereby, the decision-making process.
TABLE II
NUECHTERLEIN'S VITAL INTERESTS ASSESSMENT FACTORS^






Effect on balance of power
National prestige at stake
Attitude of key allies
Economic costs of military hostilities
Estimated casualties from hostilities
Risk of protracted conflict
Risk of enlarged conflict
Cost of stalemate or defeat
Risk of public opposition
Cost of UN opposition
Cost of congressional opposition
Additionally, the question of how input from those sectors
outside the normal decision- ma king circle is supposed to be
garnered for the political leader, who ultimately has to "decide
whether an interest is so important that the risk of war must be
taken to defend it," is left unanswered.^ What makes this more
7
I b i d . , 8 5.
8
I b i d . , 9 2.
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incongruent is that Nuechterlein infers that input from "the
scholar, the intelligence specialist, the dispassionate
journal i st--al 1 who do not let personal feelings about their
country's interests blur their perceptions of why another country
might view the world differently and react di f f eren tly--can help
considerably" in theleaders decision.^ Contrary to
Nuech terl ei n ' s assumptions on this topic, no evidence was found
during this research which indicated that scholars, intelligence
specialists, or journalists are necessarily better equipped to
divorce their personal feelings, positive or negative, about the
countries in question in a controversy, let alone, about the
political elite within their own country at any given time. In
the US decisions about the national interest, according to Fred
Sondermann, are generally made by the nation's top political
leadership, which is generally acceptable to most of the
population, most of the time.^^
Neuch terl ei n 's matrix also does not provide a means for
distinguishing in terms of long versus short term interests. '\
decision taken today by a state to realize short term gains may
at times not be in the state's long term national interest. For
some West European states some opposition parties have opted for
policies that are politically expedient and not immediately
detrimental to the state's national interests, but which could in
y I b i d .
l^Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National
Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 21.
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the long term have adverse repurcu ssi ons for the national
interest (i.e., the country's security).
D. THE UTILITY OF NUECHTERLEIN
In spite of its shortcomings, Nuechterl ei n '
s
national -i nterest matrix, when utilized in conjunction with his
value and cost/risk factors, does provide the decision-maker and
analyst with a framework for assessing to what degree a policy is
in a nation's national interest. Analysts need to plan for
contingencies in areas and with other states that impact upon
materials, locations and populations seen as vital to their
nation's interests. With the incorporation of the history,
traditions, and culture of other national actors into
Nuechterl ei n ' s value factors, these plans and assessments could
provide valuable assistance to the political decision-makers.
Before this framework can be applied to the INF controversy
and an assessment made, we must ascertain the viewpoints of the
various actors invovled, the capabilities present (this impacts
significantly on the level of the threat) and the evolution of
the problem to date (this has a bearing upon the degree of
intensity with which each actor views the controversy). We will
begin this analysis with the principle actors.
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III. THE SOVIETS' PERSPECTIVE
A. CONCERN FOR SECURITY
When reviewing Soviet authors on the subject of INF, one is
repeatedly confronted by one phrase-- "equality and equal
security."^^ This Soviet "principle" is extremely important. Y.
Kochetkov explains what the Soviets mean thusly, ". . . equal
security in the sense that limitations and reductions of nuclear
weapons would be carried out in such a manner that the security
of neither side would suffer, with all factors of the strategic
situation taken into account. "^2 jq the uninitiated this state-
ment seems quite reasonable. The disagreement arises when the
concept is interpreted by each side. Owing to historical
precedence and its "unfavorable geostrategic location" the
leaders of the Soviet Union maintain that they must consider
forces on or near their vast expanse of border other than those
of the United States. They contend the United States is not
confronted with such threats to its security. Their assessment
of equal security, therefore, is not a one for one, weapon for
weapon, equality that US leaders envision.
l^See Yevgeniy Kochetkov, "The Position of the USSR on
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control," Annals of the American Academy
of P o litical and Social Science 469 (September 1983 ) : TW]
Eugene V. Rostow, "The Russians' Nuclear Gambit," Atlantic
Com munity Qua rter ly 22 (Spring 984): 38; and Sh. Sanakoyev,
"Th e Road of Confidence and Security in Eur op e," International
Aff airs (Moscow) 4 (April 1984): p. 4.
l^Kochetkov, 139.
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The Soviet perception of nuclear weapons capabilities within
Europe and the states that possess thep inust, therefore, be
prefaced by this overwhelming concern by the Soviets for their
own nation's security. If all the rhetoric is to be believed,
this concern borders on unjustified paranoia. Additionally, it
must be recognized that the Soviets see as vital to their
security the maintenance of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, a
matter second, only to the defense of the Soviet homeland. The
Western European states, their nuclear capabilities and that
which the United States has stationed in Europe are , therefore,
considered by the Soviets in the light of these two overriding
concerns .
This goes a long way towards explaining the Kremlin's pre-
occupation with the effort to stop NATO's deployment of US
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The
Soviets have consistently maintained that these weapons, deployed
in Western Europe, are a strategic threat to the Soviet Union
because they can strike the Soviet Union proper. Furthermore,
they contend that these weapons pose a first strike capability,
due to their accuracy, especially the Pershing II, with its short
flight time. The Soviet walk-out, in November - December 1983,
of the disarmament talks, at the onset of the actual deployment
of these weapons, underscores the importance the Soviets attach
to these weapons.
The walk-out also affirms the importance the Soviet Union
attaches to Europe. The USSR and the US both have important
23
historical and economic ties to Europe. Europe, therefore,
remains, in many ways, the decisive area of the world for both
countries. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, the USSR has
made it abundantly clear that, in the interests of its own
security, it will not allow the reversal of the communist
revolutions in that area.^^ Consequently, this leaves Western
Europe, as the most decisive area on the continent. The question
the Soviets face with respect to this is how best to influence
the situation there to their own benefit.
B. COMPETING TENDENCIES
Much of the literature about the formulation of Soviet
foreign policy, especially since SALT I, has identified a
division amongst the Soviet elite over the proper approach to be
applied in world affairs, particularly in Western Europe. In
crude terms this depiction conveys, almost, an atmosphere of
"dove" versus "hawk". This misconception stems from a
significant tendency on the part of Western observers to mirror-
image" Western characteristics when viewing events in the Soviet
Union. The inclination is to perceive activities, particularly
governmental activities, in terms of how they are: 1) conducted
and 2) manifested in Western culture. This pattern is then
ascribed to similar events in other societies or cultures, such
as the Soviet Union. When in actuality, in the Soviet Union it
^•^Leonid Brezhnev quoted in P r a v d a , 13 November 1968, cited
by Robin Edmonds, Sovi et Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years





would be more accurate not to think in terms of factions, but of
"competing tendencies" within the elite. Dan and Rebecca Strode
refer to these tendencies as "unilateralist" and "di pi omaci s ts
"
approaches . ^'^. David Ulam refers to them respectively as
"speculators" and "renti ers " . ^^ These competing views of
national security policy reflect more "a difference of style and
method between decision-makers who share basic objectives" than
two permanent groupings or factions. ^^
Those of the "di pi omaci st/renti er" persuasion are seen as
viewing patience and prudence as a virtue and believing that some
degree of cooperation with the West is necessary, but that in the
end the Socialist system will win out. On the other hand, the
"unilateralist/speculator" argument concludes that detente is
basically a dead issue with the US and that it is the military
strength of the Soviet Union that got them where they are today.
It is their position that, if the Soviet Union hopes to counter
new, determined Western opposition to Soviet designs, the
military effort will have to be redoubled. ^^
This analysis of policy development appears reasonable, since
one can assume that even in an oligarchic system, it would not be
^^Dan L. Strode and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and
Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," International
Security 8 (Fall 1983): 107.
l^Adam Ulam, "Europe in Soviet Eyes," Problems of Communism




unreasonable to expect to find a divergence on the means» even if
you anticipated finding agreement on the ends. Numerous articles
and speeches can be cited supporting each of the policies. And
even -if the approach argued for in some of the speeches is
attributed to the audience being addressed (i.e., one to a
Western audience encompassing "diplomacist" ideas or one at a
Soviet military academy advocating "unilateralist" concepts),
there is more than enough evidence to support a conclusion that
differences do exist amongst the ruling elite about the proper
approach to be employed during any given timeframe. This
divergence of opinion can spill over from the formulation of
foreign policy into the formulation of military doctrine.
C. MILITARY DOCTRINE VS. MILITARY SCIENCE
The Soviets make a distinction between military doctrine and
military science. Doctrine is determined by the political elite,
which almost certainly will contain some representation from the
military elite. "The debate [in formulating doctrine] ... is
precisely over the relative weight to be given foreign oolicy
concerns and military interests.. .."^^ But once doctrine is
established, the military is responsible for developing military
science in such a manner to insure the achievement of the
"pol i tical -mi 1 i tary objectives" of the doctrine. Figure 1, on
the following page, shows at which levels of the governmental/
military structure doctrine and strategy are developed, the path
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Figure 1 A^ The Institutional Framev/crk of Soviet Military
Though t
l^John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power :









Soviet military doctrine and military science must be
considered when addressing the subject of nuclear weapons. Like
the US, the USSR may hold that the essential purpose of nuclear
weapons is to prevent war (doctrine), but once war starts and
particularly once the nuclear threshold is crossed, the Soviet
plan (military science) "is to conclude the conflict, regardless
of its intensity of duration, on terms favorable to the Soviet
Union. "20
D. EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH
Given the general agreement on the ultimate goal by the
Soviet elite and only a divergence on how best to realize this
goal the question becomes at what rate will the military
improvements be pursued and within what parameters. This will in
large part be determined by which approach is in ascendancy --the
di pi omaci St/rent i er or the un i 1 ateral i st/specul tor mode of
operation. The one that has been in ascendency for several years
may be indicated by a speech given by Brezhnev, on 27 October
1982, to much of the military hierarchy. In this speech
Brezhnev, a consistent advocate of the SALT process, specifically
failed to mention START or INF, but did endorse "the military's
claim for top priority in funding . . . ."^1 On the other hand
the new General Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party,
Mikhail Gorbachev, may have signalled a turn toward the
2 0coit D. Blacker, "Military Power and Prospects,"
Washington Quarterly 6 (Spring 1983): 60.
21 Strode, 109.
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diplomacist approach with his recent proposals to the West. Time
will tell whether or not this is another alternation in approach.
In either case, it must be remembered that the approaches taken
vary only in degrees and both seek to realize the ultimate
success of the Soviet system.
This alternation may have provided the Soviet Union with sone
unforeseen benefits. As the Soviets see the situation--the West
Europeans maintain a dichotomous image of the USSR. The
dichotomy, being a vision of the Soviet Union as peaceable and
desirous of expanding cooperation, while at the same time
dangerous, if the West Europeans allow themselves to be pushed
Into policies which threaten Soviet interests. The Soviets have
attempted to employ this perceived trend among some West
Europeans to their advantage from, time to time, in an attempt to
weaken European links with America. This was the primary goal of
proposals made: 1) by Brezhnev in October 1979, prior to the
NATO decision of December 1979, 2) by Andropov in October 1983,
just prior to a debate in the Bundestag (parliament) of the
Federal Republic of Germany about going ahead with the actual
deployment of US INF systems on German soil, and 3) by Gorbachev
in October 1985, just prior to the Dutch government's announced
date for deciding on whether to accept deployment of US GLCMs on
their soil and just a little over a month before a US/USSR
summit. 22 jp such instances. West Europeans are described by the
22see Raymond L. Garthoff, "Brezhnev's Opening: The TNF
Tangle," Foreign Policy 41 (Winter 1979-80): 82; Myron Hedlin,
"Moscow's Line on Arms Control," Problems of Communism 33 (May-
June 1984): 23; and Robert A. Kittle, "Arms-Control Struggle:
Who Wants What," U.S. News I World Report , 14 October 1985, p.
25.
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Soviets as unwilling accomplices of the United States in some
venture to which the Soviet Union is totally opposed. ^2 As
noted, this approach has been tried by the Soviet Union on
various occasions with respect to the INF controversy.
E. VIEWPOINTS ON ASPECTS OF INF
The Soviets maintain there has been strategic and military
parity in Europe between the two blocs for many years. ^^ They
insisted this was true, even before NATO made the twin-track
decision, and have consistently contended this parity existed at
several stages of their INF build-up. ^^ They maintain this is
possible because they have merely been modernizing their inter-
mediate and medium -range weapons with newer ones of a similar
type, not adding additional weapons. They contend they have
actually removed proportionally a higher number of the older
systems than the new systems they have installed. ^6 jhe number
of missile launchers and bombers has, in fact, been reduced in
some instances, but the number of warheads, the ranee, and the
accuracy have all been increased or improved. See Appendix E for
the trends in warheads.
23uiam, 25.
2^V. Nekrasov, "Under the Cover of a 'Soviet Threat',"
International Affairs (Moscow) 2 (February 1981): 66,
^^Gunther Gillessen, "Countering Soviet Nuclear Supremacy in
Europe," NATO Review 30 (June 1982): 20.
2^See excerpt from speech by Leonid Brezhnev, 6 October
1979, quoted by Raymond L. Garthoff, "Brezhnev's Opening: The
TNF Tangle," Foreign Policy 41 (Winter 1979-80): 83; and
Kochetkov, 1 41"^ —
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Although they insist their new systems are mere upgrades of
older» obsolete systems^ and is consistent with the status quo
ante» the Soviets insist the deployment of US Pershing lis and
GLCMs violates "the principle of parity and equal security."
They repeatedly make the same argument that because these systems
can strike Soviet territory, function as counterforce weapons
against Soviet strategic systems {ICBMs)» and can hit vital
command, control, and communication (C3) systems, that they are
first strike, strategic weapons. ^^ The Soviets point not only to
the deployment of the Pershing lis and GLCMs as an example of US
abandonment of the "the tested principles of equality and equal
security," but also to US proposals put forth at Geneva on IMF.^^
In these negotiations the Soviets point to the items outlined
above as examples of the US's failure to negotiate in good
faith--those are: 1) parity prior to US deployments, 2) the new
US systems represent strategic, first strike capabilities, and
3) new Soviet INF weapons are mere modernization. They say that
proposals put forth by the Reagan administration, such as the
"zero option" are merely propaganda ploys, because "clearly such
^^See V. Abarenkov, "Washington's Big Lie Concerning
Geneva Talks," International Affairs (Moscow) 5 (May 1984
Vladimir Baranovs ky , "From Moscow: The Search for Peace
Europe," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 39 (February 1983)
Garthoff, 92-93; V. Glushkov, "The West European
Mi 1 i tary- Industri al Complex and the NATO Aggressive Plans
International Affairs (Moscow) 4 (April 1984): 35; Arthu
Rachwal d, "The Soviet Approach to West Europe," Current H
82 (October 1983): 311; and G. Yevgenyev and A. Aleximov
Problem of Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe," Internatio














a proposal was unacceptable for the USSR." Additionally, they .
contend that all subsequent proposals amount to little more than
variations on the "zero option" proposal. ^^ They argue that, in
the final analysis, "this US administration is sticking to its
old one-sided position and is not showing the slightest desire to
take account of the lawful interests of the other side, to reach
an honest mutually acceptable agreement. "^^ The Soviets depict
the US as committing a volte-face in negotiations, when they told
their NATO allies the "only way to get an agreement out of the
Russians was to deploy the missiles. "31 They characterize a
tougher line by the US, which the Soviets say some in Washington
presume "can bully the Soviet Union into accepting its
propositions . . . [,as] a fallacious approach unlikely ever to
bear f ru i t. "32
Another facet of INF the Soviets ere attaching increasing
importance to is the need for French and British nuclear
capabilities to be included in INF totals. The Soviets argue
quite skillfully that the three states, the US, France, and
Britain are all NATO allies. And, to the concern of many in the
West, particularly in Western Europe, they say it is clear that
"the USSR has no intention of making its own security, and that
of its allies, dependent on the actions of third states that are
^^Abarenkov, 99.
30v. Israelyan, "Two Approaches to the Disarmament Problem,




not parties to the accord and refuse to limit their nuclear
arms. "33 jhe USSR Defense Minister summed up the Soviet view on
the subject of French and British nuclear capability, in an
interview with a TASS correspondent, as follows:
The demand that the nuclear weapons of Britain and France
be counted on the NATO side is not a bargaining point for us
but, an objective need stemming from the interests of ensuring
our security . . . the Soviet Union must and will have the
equivalent of the above-mentioned weapons in any case. 34
Gorbachev's recent proposals attempt to address this Soviet
concern by incorporating the new US European INF capability into
the strategic negotiations and offering to negotiate with the
French and the British separately. Adopting Gorbachev's
proposals would mean that much of the US's nuclear capabilities
in Europe would be included in the proposed fifty percent cut in
strategic systems by both the US and the USSR. Similar Soviet
systems (i.e., the SS-20) dre omitted from such negoti at i ons . 35
At the strategic/long-range level this inflates the number of US
strategic warheads. At the INF level this leaves the French and
British systems alone to be matched against all Soviet
intermediate/medium- range systems.
The Soviet perception of weapon systems parity, which they
say existed prior to the deployment of the new US INF capability,
is depicted in Table III.
33Yevgenyev and Aleximov, 59.
34interview with Marshal Dmitry Ustinov, USSR Defense
Minister, in Pravda
,
31 July 1983, cited by G. Yevgenyev and A
Aleximov, "The Problem of Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe,"
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The basic elements of the Soviet position on INF, listed
below» stem from Soviet arguments noted above.
1) The USSR should be allowed INF missiles in Europe; the
UnitedStatesshouldnot.
2) British and French bombers and missiles should be counted
either in the United States' INF total or be negotiated
against Soviet INF systems, but only after the US INF is
removed from Europe.
3) Soviet missiles and bombers outside the European part of
the USSR should not be included in European INF
negotiations; and,
4) Much of the US tactical fighter aircraft in the European
theater should be included in the US's INF total. ^7
-^^David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1983 ) , pT 7T
.
^^Mark B. Schneider, "The Future: Can the Issues Be
Resolved?" In Arms Control : Myth Versus Real i ty , ed. Richard F.
Starr (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p.
124.
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IV. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
A. VIEWPOINT ON INF
Given the unprovoked change in the status quo brought about
by the Soviet deployment of a new generation of INF systems in
the mid-to-late 1970s and the Soviet's position in INF
negotiations, many US analysts contend that it is not "equal"
security the Soviet Union desires, but "absolute" security. They
argue that in the ongoing INF negotiations what the Soviet Union
is actually seeking is a sanctioning, by the West of a Soviet
force eoual to all other nuclear forces. To this end, they seek
to establish, by treaty, a precedent in Europe for this concept.
The US position is that the INF advantage the Soviets enjoyed
prior to Soviet deployments of new systems was transformed into
an overwhelming superiority in INF systems prior to US INF
deployments. Table IV portrays the US position on the status of
INF forces prior to the initial deployment of its new INF
systems.
B. PAST ACTIONS REFERENCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE
The US position on INF, particularly in the late-1970s and
early 1980s has to be viewed against the backdrop of Soviet
advances in strategic systems, as well. This is particularly
true since, at one time, the US advantage in the size of its
central systems compensated for Soviet superiority in
1 ntermedi ate/me di urn -range systems in Europe. The US, did not
35
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have any IRBMs or MRBMs deployed in Europe after the early
1960s, ^^ in spite of a large Soviet force of SS-4 MRBMs, and
SS-5 IRBMs. 40
The same perceptions about the Soviets that led to the
withdrawl of US intermediate and medium-range systems from Europe
was in part responsible for the Soviets attaining their current
superiority in strategic systems. Major General William E. Odom,
at the time the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, for
the U.S. Army, summarized the Soviet achievement of strategic
superiority this way:
38 Hoi 1 oway
, p . 74
.
-^^Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Whence the Threat to
Peace
,
third edition (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1984),
p. 40.
40At one time the number approached 750. Garthoff, 85.
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It was widely believed by Western military analysts and
defense officials in the 1960s that the Soviet nuclear force
structure goals were parity with the United States. Secretary
of Defense McNamara
. . . did not expect the Soviet land-based
ICBM force to grow beyond 1054 [the US number]. ... by 1975
approximately 1600 ICBM launchers were in the Soviet force.
...the number dropped to about 1400, but the number of
warheads... increased dramatically. ...Accuracy also improved.
...At the same time» evidence appeared that Soviet launchers
have a reload capability. ...Such a Soviet force clearly
exceeds what Western analysts judge necessary for
deterrence.^ 1
C. CHANGES IN POLICY
The Soviet attainment of strategic parity in the mid-1970s,
followed by superiority in many categories in the late-1970s and
early 1980s correspond with the US development of new strategies.
The "Schlesinger Doctrine", National Security Decision Memorandum
242 (NSDM-242), attempted to move away from the "mutual suicide"
of Robert McNamara's mutual assured destruction (MAD) policy.
Espoused in January 1974, NSDM-242 envisioned a wider range of
scenarios. It evolved into the "countervailing strategy" of
President Carter's Directive 59 {PD-59) of July 1980. This
restructuring of US strategic doctrine was influenced and shaped
by 1) a need to maintain a secure second strike, 2) the
requirement for the US deterrent to be credible in Soviet eyes,
and 3) the fact that MAD spelled unacceptable damage to the US.^^
^^William E. Odom, Major General, U.S. Army, "The Soviet
Approach to Nuclear Weapons: A Historical Review," The An nal s of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 469
( September 1983) : FZW,
^^Leon Goure, "The U.S. 'Countervailing Strategy' in Soviet
Perception," Strategic Review 9 (Fall 1981): 53.
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These changes in US strategy continued to reflect elements of
several underlying differences between US and Soviet policy
development. In the Soviet Union long term policy goals are
clearly understood and, in spite of variations in the approach
taken, there is a marked consistency in its policy towards
nuclear weapons development, arms control, and Europe. This is
an outgrowth of an oligarchic system, with ascendancy to the top
echelons of the ruling elite coming only after lengthly
apprenticeship at ascending levels of authority and responsibility
The US, on the other hand, with its highly pluralistic
society has often had its top leadership ascend to their
positions of power with only limited governmental experience and
often no external policy experience. The policy of such leaders
frequently fails to be in agreement, not only with that of the
opposition party, but often with influential members of their own
party. This lack of continuity inHeadership has, on several
occasions, made for marked departures in policy concerning
nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, and Europe. These changes
have, therefore, resulted as much, if not more so, from internal
dissatisfaction with the policy in place at the time as from any
perceived change in the US's external relationships (i.e., with
the Soviet Union or Europe). Although the plethora of academic
analysis of the nuclear age, its weapons and the possible
ramifications that are hypothesized about their use, the threat
of their use, and the abdication of their use, has played a
significant role in the shaping and reshaping of American policy.
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quite often such policy changes in the US have been shaped to a
large degree by politics.
In consonance with this revision of US strategic doctrine in
the mid-to-late 1970s and in response to a West European desire
for a credible link between its security and US central systems
the US concurred in the decision to deploy a new generation of US
INF systems in Western Europe, thus insuring NATO's short term
credibility. This deployment was intended to deny the Soviets
escalation dominance in tfie INF category. The intent of the US
strategy was not meant so much, to assure the US could win a
limited nuclear war, as much as it was meant to prevent the
Soviets from being able to be assured of winning such a conflict,
and thereby maintaining the status quo and enhancing long term
s t a b i 1 i ty .
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V. NATO DILEMMA
A. EUROPEAN POLITICAL ELITE ON INF
As was noted in the preceding section, the US INF deployment
came at the instigation of West European political elite's
initiatives. The Western European political elite's assessment
of INF in the late 1970s generally did not acree with that of the
Soviet Union. Commencing in 1911 ^ the West European political
elite became increasingly alarmed by Soviet "modernization" of
its INF capability, particularly with the continuing Soviet
deployment of SS-20s. After the US's INF deployments were
initiated, the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) ambassador to
NATO at the time and its recently appointed Intelligence Chief,
Hans-Georg Wieck, assessed the Soviet's intentions this way; the
"Soviet INF deployments were obviously designed to decouple
Europe from the nuclear umbrella of the United States. "^"^
Yet some in the West have questioned this concern over the
Soviet upgrade of its INF. They point out that the Soviets have
enjoyed "superiority" in Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces
(LRTNF)**^ in Europe for some time. They overlook the fact that
^-^Hans-Georg Wieck, "The Soviet Union and the Future of
East-West Relations," NATO Review 32 (April 1984): 21.
^^"Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces" (LRTNF) was the term
used by NATO until 1981 to describe what will be identified in a
later chapter of this study as intermediate-range and medium-
range systems. In 1981 the Reagan administration, at the
insistence of Europeans, adopted the following categories for
nuclear systems deployed in Europe: 1) longer-range
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throughout the 1950s, 196-05, and part of the 1970s the United
States' superiority in strategic forces more than offset any
Soviet superiority in European-based nuclear forces. But SALT
led to strategic parity. And, at the same time strategic parity
was becoming a reality the USSR commenced installation of a new,
more effective INF, in the form of SS-20s and Backfire bombers.
This perceived change in the status quo concerned the European
political elite.
This was most clearly demonstrated in a speech delivered by
Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor at the time, on 28
October 1977, to a gathering at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, in London. In this speech he skillfully
illuminated European perceptions about arms control and how they
viewed the effect of such negotiations upon those aspects of
nuclear arms competition that directly impacted upon Western
Europe .
SALT neutralizes their [the Soviet Union's and the United
States'] strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this
magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and
West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons . . . . It
is of vital interest to us all that the negotiations between
the two superpowers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear
strategic weapons should continue and lead to a lasting
intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF), 2) shorter-range
intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF), and 3) short-range
nuclear forces (SNF). LRINF and LRTNF are rough equivalents. It
was felt that the term "theater" had decoupling connotations;
Europeans wanted to emphasize the fact that Europe was more than
just another theater. For the purpose of this paper INF, LRTNF,
LRINF are essentially equivalent terms. Specific categories of
nuclear weapons are addressed in Chapter 8. David N. Schwartz,
NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 19831, p. 193 (footnote no. 1).
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agreement. The* nuclear powers have a special, an overwhelming
responsibility in 'this field. On the other hand, we in Europe
must be particularly careful to ensure that these negotiations
do not neglect the components of NATO's deterrence
strategy . . . . 45
B. WHAT LED TO NATO'S INF DECISION
Subsequent to the speech, an analysis of the current status
of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities and a review
of responses open to NATO were conducted. A list of alternatives
was compiled by October 1978. In January 1979 the subject was
addressed by the leaders of the US, Britain, the FRG, and France
(Carter, Callaghan, Schmidt, and Giscard, respectively) during a
summit in Guadeloupe. By the end of March 1979, as a result of
US diplomatic missions to the various allies in January and
March, the British, West German, and Italian governments had
verbally committed themselves to receiving new US INF systems.
In April 1979, at West German and Dutch insistence, a NATO study
of the feasibility of an arms control initiative coupled with INF
deployment resulted in an Integrated Decision Document, which was
adopted by NATO on 12 December 1979.^6
With this decision NATO member nations obligated themselves
to the deployment of a new generation of US INF systems, if the
US and the USSR failed to negotiate a rollback of the new Soviet
INF systems by December 1983. Although it may be argued that the
^^Helmut Schmidt, "The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture,"




"Nuc 1 ear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1983 )




real credibility of security rests "on the recognition of mutual
vital interests and mutual trust," whenever Europe's sense of
security has been undermined or European trust of the US has been
in question, since World War II, the reaction has been to seek
reassurance in the form of some new manifestation of US nuclear
commitment to Europe.^'' With parity at the strategic level, this
need could not be met credibly by US central systems, thus a
prime motivition behind NATO's decision to deploy 108 Pershing lis
and 464 GLCMs was a lack of faith in the US obligation to Europe.
During the intervening four years, there was much debate on all
sides about the original decision and whether the deployment
should really take place as planned. But the display of basic
West European-American solidarity on the actual deployment of the
new US INF systems has, in fact, led to the temporary thwarting
of Soviet goals, both long and short range.
Ultimately, the Soviets would like to see the Atlantic
Alliance disintegrate and US troops withdrawn, but in the short
term they would be pleased to see NATO seriously fragmented or,
at the very least, divisive. The Soviets deployed the SS-20 to
enhance the Soviets already superior INF position, but this led
the West European political elite to conclude a solution that ran
counter to these overarching Soviet aims. As anticipated, the
West Europeans Questioned the validity of the US nuclear shield
even more than they had the SALT negotiations. But, rather than
^^Christoph Bertram, "The Implications of Theater Nuclear
Weapons in Europe," Foreign Affairs 60 (Winter 1981-82): 310.
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dismiss the US and acquiescence to Soviet demands, European
leaders opted for strengthening the alliance that had served
Western Europe for thirty years and concluded that flexible
response in Europe was only plausible if NATO had an effective
nuclear deterrent on the European continent. They rejected the
attempted acquisition of "escalation dominance" by the Soviet
Union. With the December 1979 decision, "NATO was telling the
Soviet Union that its attempt to achieve overwhelming
superiority, with the aid of intermediate-range nuclear weapons,
would not succeed. "^^ Unfortunately, not all Europeans ascribe
tothisanalysisofthesituation.
C. OPPOSITION TO THE DECISION
The same individuals who question West European governmental
leader's concern over the Soviet INF upgrade also display a
tendency to identify the threat to European peace as the US INF
deployments. These Europeans mistakenly think the US wants to
"regionalize" the danger of war to Europe, whereas, the truth is
that deterrence is only credible, if it is believed that the
weapons of deterrence may be used as weapons of war. With
strategic parity, the threat to use US central systems to protect
Western Europe, if conventional and tactical nuclear weapons
failed, was not credible. The NATO decision was made to provide
NATO a credible deterrent in Europe and reestablish a more
credible link with US strategic systems. In countries such as
^^Gil lessen, 19.
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Belgium and the Netherlands, these individuals are sizeable in
numbers. But, as the Prime Minister of France, Pierre Mauroy,
pointed out in September, 1982, those
certain European countries, . . . that have doubts about
it, must be convinced that medium -range nuclear arms, whose
deployment has been decided upon, will be added to the
[European nuclear] arsenal not in order to wage a war limited
to Europe, but Quite the contrary, to make it clear to an
eventual adversary that such a limited war is impossible.'^^
NATO leaders did attempt to anticipate and allay public fears
about deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe at the same
time they made their original decision to deploy. The December
1979 decision established that 1,000 nuclear warheads already in
place in Western Europe would be removed in the short term and
then as each new INF missile was installed one additional warhead
would be withdrawn. In actuality "the United States unilaterally
withdrew some 1,000 theater nuclear warheads during 1980 and . .
1,400 more in 1984. In other words, a total of only 572 GLCMs
and Pershing lis will be replacing the 2,400 . . .taken out."^*-'
But this is overlooked or discounted by those who question the
deployment.
The population base to support such a popular movement
against deployment of new nuclear weapons systems was already
^^France, Foreign Ministry (French Embassy in the United
States), excerpts of remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to
the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, 20 September 1982,
document 82/89 (New York: French Embassy Press and Information
Service, 1981 ) , p. 8.
S^Richard F. Starr, Arms Control : Myth Versus Reality
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. x.
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present, since a vigorous nuclear disarmament campaign attracted
much attention in' We stern Europe in the early 1960s. ^^ Also, the
Soviet Union created the International Information Department
(IID) in 1978 as an element in their attempts to make their
foreign propaganda effort more effective. It quite probably was
Moscow's intention to use the organization "to stimulate the rise
of West European peace movements in the late 1970's."^2 jhg NATO
governments have more or less been able to withstand the pressure
of these attempts to sidetrack the deployment. Their primary
motivations have been to maintain a semblence of solidarity and
provide a viable deterrent to the ever increasing Soviet nuclear
c a p a b i 1 i ty .
D. NATO COUNTRIES NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED
The roles played by the various NATO members to enhance
solidarity and insure deterrence have their roots in their pasts,
but have been greatly affected by current considerations. Both
must be understood in order to understand the positions taken to
date by the various members on the INF controversy and possible
future actions or inactions. In terms of the INF controversy,
NATO, exclusive of the North American continent, can be viewed as
consisting of three groupings: 1) the European nuclear powers,
2) the INF site countries, and 3) all others.
^^Stanley Hoffman, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and
Unreasons," Foreign Affairs 60 (Winter 1981-82): 327.
^2j. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European
Peace Movements," Problems of Communism 31 (November-December
1982): 45.
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Of the latter group, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark,
Norway, and Iceland have been limited in their participation in
NATO nuclear matters by strong pacifist domestic political
groups. All broke with unsuccessful, but long neutralist
traditions when they entered into the NATO alliance in 1949.
They already had developed policies banning the stationing of
nuclear weapons on their soil, when the US first offered IRBMs,
back in 1957.53 However, these countries, in spite of their
domestic bans, have not usually resisted NATO initiatives to
deploy such devices elsewhere.
The remainder of the "other states" are part of NATO's
southern tier, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey (Spain was not a NATO
member in 1979). Basing any of the new INF weapons in Portugal
would have had limited effect because of range limitations (not
as pronounced, but similar to the IRBMs deployed in Western
Europe in the late 1950s). As for Greece, anti-Americanism and
an anti-NATO drift were in full swing and growing in 1979,
following the return of civilian rule and the Cyprus debacle of
1974. Prime Minister Karamanlis, as he had been during the IRBM
controversy of the late 1950s, was constrained by domestic
considerations from countenancing any expansion of Greece's role
in NATO at the time. The popular sentiment would reach full
flower with the accession to power of Andres Papandreou, head of
the Greek Socialist Party, PASOK, in 1981, on a platform of
withdrawing Greece from NATO and expelling US forces from Greece.
^^Schwartz
, p . 73
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Turkey was experiencing a domestic upheaval unparalleled, since
the founding days of the republic. It was facing an external
crisis of growing dimensions in the Islamic Revolution in
neighboring Iran. And in its relations with the US, Turkey was
still laboring under the shadow of effects surrounding Cyprus.
It would take the intervention of the military in 1980, for a
third time in the hi sto ry of the republic, to reestablish some
sense of order in Turkey. Given all of of these considerations,
Turkey was not seeking to increase its profile with respect to
its neighbor to the northeast, the Soviet Union, by accepting the
deployment of new US nuclear weapons on its soil.
This left Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, and the
Netherlands (France was not an option given its withdrawal from
NATO's military command) as possible sites for the new US INF.
As already alluded to all of these nations faced constraints of
their own to deployment of such systems on their soil.
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VI. INF SITE COUNTRIES: THE HIDDEN COSTS
A. WHO ARE THE SITE COUNTRIES?
Although Britain falls into this category, it, due to its
independent nuclear capability, will be addressed in the
succeeding chapter. The other four nations that have or are
scheduled to receive US INF deployments, the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands do not possess
their own nuclear capability (although they each have some
nuclear capable systems). All indorsed the 1979 NATO Decision to
deploy new US INF systems in response to continuing Soviet
deployments of new INF systems. The governments of both Belgium
and the Netherlands withheld final approval to accept deployment
on their soil to a later date. Both have subseouently done so.
The nation that played a central role in the INF deployment, as
with many of NATO's plans, was the FRG.
B. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
The FRG has been at the center of NATO plans since before its
accession into the NATO structure, which took place shortly after
attaining sovereign status in 1955. Since that time its role has
increased significantly, becoming central to the NATO structure
in all facets. The vast preponderance of NATO's military forces
are deployed in the FRG. Geographically it is essential for any
viable conventional defense of Western Europe. As the "land of
the middle", occupying the heart of Europe, Germany has
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traditionally been and remains the ideal invasion route between
Eastern and Western Europe. In addition to this physical
determinancy, the FRG's economic strength, the largest GNP in
Western Europe, and its military primacy, the largest army
(exclusive of the US) in the alliance, insure it a significant
role i nail ianceaffairs.
As noted in the opening paragraph of this chapter the FRG
does not possess a nuclear capability of its own. The FRG, as a
prerequisite to rearmament, pledged not to develop a nuclear
weapons capability on its soil. This was given to allay the
fears of its European allies, as much, if not more so, than the
Soviet Union. But this has left it, the NATO member most exposed
to a Warsaw Pact invasion, completely dependent upon an outside
c a p a b i 1 i ty for its ultimate security.
In light of this, throughout the alliance's history, the
governments in power in the FRG have displayed a willingness to
repeatedly accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil.
At times, such as during the Multilateral Force (MLF) controversy
of the early 1960s, the government has indicated a particular
desire for nuclear control sharing. As a result of its
importance to the alliance and its desire to be accorded the
prestige of the other major alliance members, such as France and
Britain, it was awarded a permanent seat in Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG). This insures the FRG a role in the alliance's
nucleardecisions.
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These government positions on nuclear weapons have not been
without opposition. The first controversy over nuclear weapons
was sparked by the American offer of IRBMs to its NATO allies in
December 1957. The SPD led the political opposition, with an up
and coming Helmut Schmidt, playing a prominent role in this
debate against acceptance. According to public opinion polls at
the time, a significant portion of the population opposed such
deployments. But Konrad Adenauer, the Chancelor at the time, saw
to the approval of such deployments, because of his desire to
solidify the FRG's ties to the V/est through a firm display of
support for NATO.^^ Similar opposition manifested itself in the
debate of the late 1970s and early 1980s concerning the
deployment of a new US INF on German soil. Recognition of this
domestic setting was a factor in Chancel 1 or Helmut Schmidt's
insistence that at least one other continental NATO member share
in the deployment. He also sought to link arms control
negotiations for INF systems with the deployment decision.
It is important to recogriize that the role that the FRG has
played to date and will play in the future within NATO is shaped,
not only by its concern for security, which primarily
necessitates the addressment of a multitude of external
constraints , but, as with all the alliance members, internal
constraints, as well. David Schwartz, in his work
NATO's Nuclear Di lemmas, has succinctly identified the
conflictino external considerations; given the FRG's unique
S^ibid., pp. 7-73.
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geographic location and its historical legacy, these factors are
extremely complex. The FRG
. . . has always had to balance its various objectives
delicately: to play an active and constructive role within the
alliance without reawakening the suspicions and resentments of
its opponents in World War II; to come to a more stable
relationship with East Germany without raising American fears
of German revanchism; to seek reunification on terms acceptable
to the West without destabilizing the postwar balance of power;
and to pursue all its goals without antagonizing either enemies
or friends.^^
All of these factors affected the FRGs position on US IMF
deployments. It did not want to jeopardize its relationship with
the German Democratic Republic (DDR), which necessitated
considering Soviet desires. At the same time it wanted to insure
its own security and NATO solidarity. Schmidt therefore fought
for Bundestag (parliamentary) approval of the NATO position on
the need for the new INF deployments, but wanted US assurance
that the actual basing would be shared. He hoped this would
dissipate Soviet wrath somewhat. Even so, the Soviet Union made
a significant propaganda effort to stop FRG's 1979 approval of
the NATO position and its 1983 acceptance of new INF deployments
on its soil. In so doing, it played up the opposition's
position.
Internally though, the FRG has enjoyed a remarkable political
consensus since 1960 amongst the major parties on the subject of
NATO. It was not until after Helmut Schmidt stepped down from
his leadership role of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that
55ibid.,p.6.
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there was a divergence between the two largest parties on the US
INF depl oyments.5^ This was precipitated by the ascendancy of
the left-wing within the SPD. It is reflective of a
youth-centered, anti-nuclear movement, which has been manifested
in the "Greens" political movement within the FRG. This movement
has been able to play upon the same fears that were present in
the late 1950s debate over deployment of nuclear weapons. But,
in spite of this and a significant portion of the population's
expressed opposition to deployment of the new INF systems, the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government, openly supportive of
the deployment, was returned to office in federal elections in
1983.
Historical precedence, recent elections and current social
trends indicate a continuing political majority clustered around
the center of the West German political spectrum, embodied in the
Free Democratic Party (FDR). The selection of Johannes Rau, a
SPD moderate, over Oskar Lafontaine, an anti-nuclear, anti-NATO
advocate, as the SPD's chancellor candidate for the 1987 federal
elections is a further indication of this. Rau recently spoke in
positive terms with the U.S. Ambassador to the FRG, Richard Burt,
about West Germany's role in NATO.^'' This bodes well for a West
German government generally highly supportive of NATO
^^Frederick Painton, "Protest by the 'New Class'," Time, 28
February 1983, pp. 30-31.
^^"Diplomat: W. German 'Neutralism' Fading," Monterey
Peninsula Herald, 4 November 1985, p. 7.
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soli clarity. 5^ Therefore, as long as the alliance remains
dedicated to its 1979 deployment decision, it would be unlikely
in the near future for any West German government to demand
removal of the US INF .
C. ITALY
A major actor in the deployment decision of new IMF systems
in Western Europe was the Italian government. Italy was the
first member of NATO to unconditionally accept basing of a
portion of the INF on its soil (although Italy stressed the need
for associated arms control negotiations).^^ There were both
traditional and new factors involved with that decision.
Italy's postwar foreign oolicy has been shaped by its
membership in the EC and NATO. Its membership in the latter
provided for Italy's external security and allowed it to
concentrate on internal security and economic revitaliation_.
Italy perceived its obligations to the alliance as twofold:
first that of providing a military force, the bulk of which is
NATO dedicated, and secondly, but foremost, that of basing
facilities for NATO/US forces. In light of this Italy did not
pay significant attention to its military until the past decade.
^^Phillip J. Gick, "The Free Democratic Party in the Federal
Republic of Germany: Is the Political Process About to Change?"
(Seminar Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985) pp. 35-36.
5^See Luiqi Caligaris, "Italian Defence Policy: Problems
and Prospects," Survival 25 (March-April 1983): 69; Schwartz, pp
2 29-230; Wayne C~. Thompson, Western Europe 1982 (Washington,
D.C.: Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., 1982), p. 319.
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In 1975 a restructuring and modernization of the military v/as
begun. Although Italy's percent of GNP expenditure on its
military has consistently remained one of the lowest,
extrabudgetary laws (insulated from inflation) were passed in
1977 to fund the modernization program. ^^ According, to this
plan, the number of units would be reduced, but readiness
increased. In addition to this increased attention to the status
of the military, the Italian government began to seek a larger,
more active role in international affairs.
In fact, failure to be invited to the 1979 industrialized
nations' summit in Guadeloupe may have acted as an additional
catalyst to Italy's seeking a larger role in NATO affairs,
through its ready acceptance of. INF basing on Italian so i 1.^1 In
either case, the Italian decision involved support across the
political spectrum. Even the Italian Communist Party (PCI) did
not take the Soviet position on the subject. Trying not to
undermine its relatively recent position of supporting the NATO
alliance, the PCI sought a suspension of both SS-20 deployments
and US INF produc ti on . ^^ The entire process reflected a
^^See Caligeris, 68; Stefano Silvestri, "The Italian
Paradox: Consenus Amid Instability," in The Internal Fabric of
WesternSecurity
, ed. Gregory A. Flynn e t al (Totowa , New Jersey :
Al 1 anhel d , Osmun , and Co., 1981), pp. 142-145; and Thompson, p.
319.
^^Schwartz, p. 230; and Thompson, p. 319.
^^interview with Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary of the
Italian Communist Party (PCI), 26 July 1980, cited in Enrico
Berlinguer, "Interview to Oriana Fallaci," The It a li an C o mmunists
3 (July-September 1980): 77-80; Silvestri, p. 140.
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maturation of the Italian foreign and defense process^ from that
followed in the early days of the alliance and insured continuing
Italian support for deployment, regardless of a change in
gove rnme n ts . ^ ^
D. BELGIUM
The INF commitment in Belgium has also remained, surprisingly
on track, given the country's domestic political chaos.
Belgium's political stability is a continuing problem due to the
marked ethnic divisions within the country. There are no major
national parties in Belgium today. All three of the largest
party "groups", the Christian, Socialist, and the Liberals, are
divided into regional parties. The largest group is known as the
Christian People's Party" (CVP) in Dutch-speaking Flanders (56% of
the population), whereas in French-speaking Wallonia (3 2% of the
population) it is known as the Christian Social Party (PSC).
Although the two are inclined to cooperate in forming governing
coalitions, their appeal is strictly to their separate regions.^^
^^In the past such decisions were made by the government
alone. In fact most decisions of this nature were made by the
select few who were on the Supreme Defense Council (the
President, Prime Minister, Foreign, Defense, and Interior
ministers. Chief of Staff and the chiefs of the three branches,
and anyone else the President selects). An example of the
smoothness that has accompanied the acceptance of the INF
deployments by the government is found in the fact that Cossiga
of the Christian Democrats was Prime Minister at the time the
decision to deploy was made, while Craxi of the Socialists was
Prime Minister at the time of deployment. See Caligaris, 69; and
Schwartz, p. 230.
64 Thompson, p . 177.
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Concern over insuring equity between the two major regions of the
country could cause division within a ruling coalition, for
domestic reasons, at any time.
This has been a major factor in there having been thirty-
three government coalitions formed since 1944. During the most
recent elections, on 13 October 1985, the ruling coalition, the
two regional Christian parties and the two regional Liberal
parties, captured 116 of 212 of the Parliamentary seats. This
marked an increase, signalling stronger support for the
coalition's austere domestic policy than opinion polls had
predicted. The election was also significant for INF
deployments, because the returning coalition had accepted the
first 16 of 48 planned missiles only seven months prior to the
elections. Also significant was the fact that elements of the
main opposition party group, the Socialists, had stated during
the campaign that they would seek removal of the missiles if
elected. The Socialists also increased their strength in the
Parliament. The losers in the election were the two nationalist
parties and the Communist Party, the latter failing to win a seat
in the Parliament for the first time since 1925. ^^
So, even though Belgium has been a leading proponent of
European i ntegrationi st movements, such as the EC and NATO, since
their inceptions, the continuity of its external policy remains
^^Associated Press, "Belgians Re-Elect Prime Minister;
Socialists Gain, Communists Lose," Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
14
October 1985, p. 2 .
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more intimately tied to domestic political divisions than other
NATO members. But this is clearly not a new development in
Belgium. Although the Belgian government displayed some interest
in the US offer of IRBMs made at the December 1957 NATO meeting,
in the end domestic political opposition prevented any active
involvement.^^ Therefore, it should be noted that, while Belgium
continues to support transnational organizations (both NATO and
the EC have their headquarters in Brussels), it has displayed an
increasing uneasiness with NATO policy that is viewed as
disruptive to good relations with the East Bloc, particularly the
Soviet Union. Alliance solidarity, detente and the minimization
of East-West tensions all play an important role in Belgian
foreign pol icy .
In spite of domestic difficulties, given Belgium's long and
close association within the alliance, there appears reason for
optimism about its steadfastness on the INF deployment. Given
the results of recent national elections, as long as the alliance
remains committed to deployment, particularly the other countries
where the the INF is being based, Belgium will most likely remain
committed to the deployment of 48 cruise missiles on its soil by
1988.
E. THE NETHERLANDS
The future of the INF question in the Netherlands is even
less certain than it is in Belgium. The Dutch are in the
^^schwartz, p. 73.
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fore-front of the pov/erful anti-nuclear arms movement in Europe,
something that has been played upon repeatedly by the Soviets.
The movement has broad support in the Netherl ands--rel i gi ous
,
labor, and political. Mr. Joop den Uyl, the leader of the main
opposition party, the Labor Party (Pvda), explained the
philosophy behind the movement this way: "We no longer believe
in a balance of power, or balance of terror approach to
disarmament. We no longer have the feeling the nuclear umbrella
is protecting us."^^ The movement's intent is for the
Netherlands to set an example for unilateral nuclear disarmament,
which other smaller nations will in turn adopt. The hope is that
such a move will eventually force the two superpowers to
eventually do the same. The slogan the movement has adopted
incapsultes this concept: "Ban nuclear weapons from the world
and start with the Netherlands." The whole phenomenon has come
to be referred to by many in the West as "Hoi 1 andi ti s" .^^
This broad and deep concern with nuclear weapons clashes with
the Netherlands efforts to maintain solidarity with its NATO
allies and NATO's 1979 decision. The Netherlands, like Belgium,
has been in the forefront of European i ntegrati oni st movements.
The Netherlands was one of the six charter members of the EC.
Besides being a charter member of NATO, it was a signator of its
forerunner, the Treaty of Brussels. Because these goals conflict





particularly on Dutch soil, the Netherlands, although it indorsed
the original- NATO decision in December 1979, simultaneously
deferred agreement to participate in GLCM deployments for two
years in order to assess the arms control process. ^^ This
deferment to agree was continued until, 1 November 1985, almost
six years after the original decision and eight months after the
last of the other four site countries started receiving INF
systems on its soil. On that date Premier Ruud Lubber sent a
letter to Parliament stating an agreement would be drawn up
between the Netherlands and the US for deployment of 48 GLCMs on
Dutch soil.^^ But the government, consciously trying to maintain
a precarious balance between the twin goals of nuclear limitation
and alliance solidarity and cognizant of the public response to
the latest Soviet "arms limitation initiative"^^, also announced
that it would correspondingly reduce its participation in NATO's
overall nuclear deterrence by withdrawing from four other nuclear
projects involving F-16s, land mines, depth charges and
Nike-Hercul es .^-
The austere economic policies of the center-right coalition
may have been the prime reason the voters returned the coalition
69 Schwartz, p. 238.
'^^Associ ated Press, "Dutch Government OKs Deployment by NATO




71CBS, "CBS Evening News," 7 October 1985, "Dutch Anti-
nuclearists Reaction to Gorbachev's Offer in Paris," Dan Rather.
^^"Dutch Government OKs Deployment", d. 1.
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to power in the the May 1986 national elections, but the
coalition's decisions regarding deployment of INF on dutch soil
were also made a major campaign issue by Mr. Uyl.'^^ The INF
deployments in the Netherlands are not scheduled to begin before
1988. The question appears to be whether the confessional party,
the CDA, will be able to retain the traditional role of it and
its various predecessors, as a dominant coalition partner. If
so, the present policy would appear to be assured, assuming the
alliance and its members maintain their stance on deployment.
Even if the Socialist Party is part of a coalition, in some
future government, the process of coalition building necessitates
a broad and generally moderate program. Also, denying
deployment, at that point and time would necessitate revocation
of a bilateral treaty with another alliance member, the U.S.
Given all these factors, there is sufficient reason for cautious
optimism with respect to the eventual deployment.
^^"Dutch Government OKs Deployment", p. 1; Reuter, "Coalition
in Dutch Poll Win," London Times, 22 May 1986, sec. 1, p. 1.
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VII. EUROPE'S NUCLEAR POWERS
A. FRANCE AND BRITAIN: UNIQUE NATO MEMBERS
Two NATO nations whose positions, perceptions, and
capabilities must be reviewed separately from the rest of the
organization for a number of reasons, are France and Britain.
Although both France and Britain dre part of NATO, in one
capacity or another, they maintain their own nuclear
capabilities. Both have steadfastly maintained that their
systems are the minimum sufficient destructive capacity to insure
their own national security and, therefore, must remain under
their independent control. For the same reasons they are just as
emphatic about their nuclear capabilities not being included in
bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
B. FRANCE
The answer to this independent approach and the independent
nature of France's nuclear policy lies in the make up of the
French national psyche and is reflected in the French development
of their nuclear capability. In this case, the mind set preceded
the development.
1 . The Development of French Nuclear Policy and Weapons
Charles de Gaulle was not the first Frenchman to speak of
French "grandeur" or prestige. At least as far back as 1930, a
French Ambassador, Jules Cambon, observed the link between
national security and such ephemeral concepts as grandeur this way
62
Security! The term involves more indeed than the maintenance
of a people's homeland, or even their territories beyond the
seas. It also means the maintenance of the world's respect for
them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything,
in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself,
of the nation. '^^
Although grandeur may not have been an original concept
with de Gaulle, he had insight into the French national psyche.
Even after France's defeat in 1940, de Gaulle described the
inability of Frenchmen to ever willingly accede to the domination
of any other nation, whether subtle or overt, with this phrase:
"C'est dans le nature des c hoses que nous soyons les preimiers en
Europe' (it is the nature of things that we be first in
Europe) . . . ."75 jp consonance with this type of mindset, de
Gaulle recognized
. . . That the French liked grandeur almost as much as he
did, which meant glory, victories, power, supremacy universally
acknowledged, foreign emulation and admiration, and the pre-
dominance of the French language (and culture) over all others;
they could not bear to be citizens of a second-rate power,
forced to submit, like all other people, to occasional
humiliating concessions.''^
Even so, after World War II, France was completely
dependent upon the US for its security. Fortunately for the
French, they were in agreement with the US's anti-communist
philosophy and containment policy. However, the French and the
^'^Jules Cambon, French Ambassador, quoted by Anton W.
DePorte, De Gaul le ' s Foreign Policy: 1944-1946 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968, cited by Anton W
DePorte and Hugh De Santis, "The Politics of French Security,"
AEI Foreign Policy and Defense R evie w 4 (1982): 27.
^^Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (Ha rmonds worth, Middlesex,
England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1983), p. 135.
76 Ibid 145.
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us failed to agree that French colonial wars were an integral
element in such a policy. It became evident, if not before then,
definitively during the Suez Crisis, that the US and French
perceptions of the threat were divergent. ^^ This humiliation, as
the French saw it, provided the incentive for Prime Minister Guy
Mollet to accelerate French nuclear development already underway.
By late 1956 plans had been conceived for explosive tests and
construction of prototype nuclear weapons. ^^
The Fourth Republic had, therefore, laid the groundwork
on nuclear weapons development before de Gaulle returned to power
in 1958, when the Fourth Republic collapsed. But de Guile had to
first devise, establish, and implement a governmental structure
that would give the French the one man rule they had turned to in
their latest crisis, Algeria, and had relied upon so often
before, while still providing the people a voice. The
constitution he presented the French nation "curbed the power of
the Assembly, whose ever-changing moods had been the source of
many evils, and of parties. He made the governments difficult to
topple and strengthened the executive . . . ."79 j^q renowned
Italian Europeanist, Luigi Barzini, summed it up this way.
^^Edward A. Kolodziej, "French Military Doctrine," in
C omparative Defense Policy
,
ed. Frank B. Norton III, Anthony C.
Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner III {Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1974)
, pp. 247-248.
^^David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security




79 Ba rzi ni
, p . 146
.
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"de Gaulle gave the French the monarchy many of them longed for
under eyery republic, and, at the same time, the republic many of
them longed for under eyery monarchy. "^^
After tackling the issue of governmental structure de
Gaulle turned to the Algerian question, that had precipitated the
downfall of the Fourth Republic and brought him out of
retirement. But he also pressed ahead with the April 1958
decision of Prime Minister Felix Gaillard to have France's first
nuclear explosion take place in 1960.^1 De Gaulle clearly saw
the diplomatic possibilities of a French nuclear force. ^^ jq
justify the resource demands such an undertaking necessitated, he
seized upon a common, external threat, for all Frenchmen to focus
on, the "Anglosaxons." The traditional foe, Germany was too
reduced in size to provide the formidable threat he sought. The
Soviets would work counter to his goal of an independent policy,
by necessitating continued French acknowledgement of its
dependence upon the U.S. The US and Britain, as the threat, also
provided de Gaulle with the opportunity to attain revenge for the
manner in which he was treated during World War II. Additionally
it provided de Gaulle with an easy sell to the French national
psyche, because they hated owing the US not only for their
reclaimed independence, but also for the financing of their







skillfully notes, "nothing notoriously makes for bad blood
between nations and individuals as an undeniable claim for
gratitude. "^^
De Gaulle did not immediately seek a decisive break with
the US. His initial move towards a more independent and
necessarily divergent (from the US and Britain) foreign policy
was the 1958 Eisenhower Memorandum. This was an oligarchial
vision of tripartite Western cooperation, consisting of the three
leading states of NATO, France, the United States, and Great
Britain. The correspondence, primarily between France and the
US, continued throughout the remainder of the Eisenhower
administration and encompassed discussion of three-power planning
and control on a global scale, with each state to exercise an
individual, sphere of influence. The process came to a halt after
the Kennedy Administration took office and its "Grand Design"
conflicted with de Gaulle's concepts of "Europe for the
Europeans" .^4
This was followed in 1960 by the Fouchet Plan, which was
a move away from the i ntegra ti oni s t policies present in Europe at
the time and towards a more confederal system. In 1962 this
process also met with failure and confirmed de Gaulle's
suspicions that supranational structures such as the EEC were
83i a rzi ni
, pp . 149-151
.
^^Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and the




<*esigned to insure the subservience of the individual European
states v/ith respect to the US.^^
In addition to these rebuffs, during the same time frame,
de Gaulle was able to cite the Nassau Agreement, the US sale of
Polaris missiles to Britain, in lieu of the scuttled Skybolt
system, and the Cuban missile crisis as other reasons to distrust
the US. In his view the former confirmed the US's preferential
bias for Britain and, if France opted to continue being so
dependent upon the US for its future security it could undermine
the government. The latter incident, although he was one of the
first European leaders to support the Kennedy administration in
its decision on Cuba, reinforced his belief that the US could
lead France into a conflict that was not- in its best interest.
The Algerian problem was reaching a resolution at this
time also, which allowed a substantially greater reallocation of
resources from conventional military forces to nuclear weapons
and delivery systems development. By 1964 France had fielded its
first nuclear delivery vehicle, the Mirage IV. By 1968 sixty-two
had been delivered.^^ It was during this same period that the
declared policy of France increasingly depicted the US as the
greatest destabilizing factor in the international arena. ^'^ In




S^Kolodziej, p. 2 50.
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military structure of NATO. Remaining sensitive to the French
desire to be perceived as standing alone, he stated France could
provide for its own security. ^^ This concept reached its zenith
with the "every point of the compass" or "tous azimuts" concept
of the Chief of the French General Staff, General Charles
Aillerret, published in Revue de Defense National in December
1967.89
General Ailleret's concept was newer adopted as official
French government policy. Indications are it would not have been
adopted anyway, but the May 1968 protest in France produced a
pledge to spend more on domestic needs, while, at the sane time,
there was increased reason for concern about France's security,
given the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In
March 1969, his successor. General Michel Fourquet, rejected the
"all points" concept in favor of "an enemy coming from the
East". 90
De Gaulle resigned a month later as a result of the
rejection of a referendum on governmental administrative reform
he had submitted to the people. George Pompidou, his successor,
moderated the anti - Ame rican tone of French policy. During his
tenure France's first generation IRBM, the S-2, was deployed.
88joyce Lasky Shub, "Introduction," AEI Foreign Policy and
Defense Review 4 (1982): 3.
89Charles L. M. Ailleret, "Directed Defense," in American
Defense Policy
,
2nd ed., ed. Mark E. Smith and CI aude J . Johns
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 336.
90 Yos t, p. 14
.
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Eighteen silos became operational during 1971 and 1972.51 The
first two SSBNs also achieved operational status while his
administration was in office. The first was in 1971 » Le
Redoubtabi e , and the second in 1973» Le Terrible . ^ ^
Giscard d'Estaing, Pompidou's successor, went even
further in his association with the Atlantic alliance. He
recognized the importance of the ties between the FRG and the US
to the continued viability of NATO. He observed and addressed a
growing sentiment of neutralism in Germany. The Pluton tactical
missile force, the Jaguar, the third and fourth SSBNs, and the
carrier-based, nuclear capable. Super Etendard all became
operational during his admi ni s tra ti on . ^-^ Giscard also took steps
to insure the continued upgrade of France^s nuclear capabi 1 i ty .^^
While both Pompidou and Giscard sought reduced tension
and a closer association with the Western alliance, they were not
signalling a desire to reintegrate into the military wing of
NATO. 5^ During this same period, the 1970s, the increased
credibility of the perception that France's nuclear capability
91 Ibid., D . 39.
^^Robbin F. Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and
the 1990s," Comparative Strategy 4 (1984): 393.
5^See Laird, p. 393; International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Military Balance 1984-1985 (The Alden Press, 1984)', pp.
131-132.
^^Pascal Fontaine, "Analysis and Perspective: Socialist
France in East- West Relations," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense
Revi ew 4 { 1982) : 38-40.
95 Shub, 4.
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enabled it to maintain an independent stance led even the parties
of the left, the Socialists (PS) and the Communists (PCF), to
announce their support of France's nuclear program. ^^ The debate
then shifted from the strategic purpose of the force^^ and to
whether the government's economic policy would support the
implementation of the five year defense plans. ^^
2 . Current Nuclear Policies and Capabilities
With the elections in May and June 1981, the French
people voted into office a Socialist President and a Socialist
controlled National Assembly. In contrast to Socialist domestic
and economic policies, Francois Mitterrand, head of the PS and
fourth president of the Fifth Republic, has maintained a
remarkable continuity with past French foreign and defense
policy. He "has confirmed his fidelity to the Atlantic alliance
while reiterating France's determination to set its own course;
he has taken steps to expand the French nuclear arsenal while
rejecting reintegration into the NATO command . . . ."99 Figure
2, on the following page, provides a graphic depiction of the
^^Anton W. DePorte and Hugh De Santis, "The Politics of
French Security," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 4 (1982):
28.
97ibid.
9Spierre Lellouche, "France and the Euromi ssi 1 es : the
Limits of Immunity," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 4
(1982): 319. '
^
^^Micahel J. Sodaro, "Moscow and Mitterand," Problems of
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Figure 2. Evolution of French Nuclear Development.
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date, rate, and continuously increasing level of French nuclear
weapons depl oyment . ^^^
The evolution of Mitterand's position and that of the PS
reflect both internal considerations and external factors. A
1981 poll indicated that 63% of the people believed France needed
a nuclear capability to insure its defense and 62% felt the
French system provided an effective nuclear deterrent. ^"-"^ On the
other hand, Soviet actions in Afghanistan, pressure for a
crackdown in Poland, and deployments of weapons in Europe over
the past few years left neither the PS membership nor Mitterand
much choice on much of their foreign policy-^*^^
The French people as a whole have swung from seeing the
Soviet Union not as "the 'model' of justice and socialism" to
identifying it as "the living symbol of totalitarianism." And
Afghanistan, Poland, SS-20 deployments, and KAL 007 have all
contributed to this perception. Conversely, the US is no longer
^^^The data for this figure was obtained from a review of all
editions to date of the yearbook The Military Balance
,
produced
by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, based in
London. The specific years referred to and the respective pages
are as follows: 1964-1965, d. 37; 1965-1966, p. 41; 1966-1967,
p. 44; 1967-1968, p. 47; 1968-1969, p. 54; 1970-1971, pp.
106-109; 1971-1972, p. 56; 1972-1973, pp. 68-69; 1973-1974, pp.
72-73; 1974-1975, pp. 76-77; 1975-1976, pp. 76-77; 1976-1977, pp.
76-77; 1977-1978, pp. 80-81; 1978-1979, p. 84; 1979-1980, p. 92;
1980-1981, p. 102; 1981-1982, p. 108; 1982-1983; p. 116;
1983-1984, p. 122; and 1984-1985, p. 132.
^^^Charles Hernu, "France's Defense: Choices and Means," Le
Figaro , 30-31 Janua ry 1982, quoted in France, Foreign Ministry
( French Embassy in the United States), document 82/43 (New York:
French Embassy Press and Information Service, 1982), p. 2.
102sodaro, 27.
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seen as "the dominant military power, but . . . . as a needed
ally in the face of an increasingly threatening Soviet Union. "l^^
And 66% of those polled in one survey in France said they thought
the US would come to Europe's defense. ^^^
So Mitterand was perfectly in step with the French
perception of the threat when, only two weeks after his election,
in a meeting with the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, he
categorically stated that the Soviet deployment of SS-20s had
disrupted the balance in Europe and that NATO should
counterbalance by rearming. ^'-'^ Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy,
echoed his position later that year when he addressed the
Institute of Higher Defense Studies. He also noted that the
SS-20 was a missile "that specifically threatens Europe. It has
a destabilizing effect and consequently justifies the existence
of an autonomous French deterrent force. "^'-'^ He thus turned the
tables on the Soviets who were arguing for inclusion of French
forces in any negotiated arms settlement.
A year later, addressing the same orgnization, Mauroy
specifically addressed the government's position on being
included in such negotiations.
lO^Lellouche. 321.
^^^DePorte and De Santis, 31.
^'-'^Fontaine,36.
lO^France, Foreign Ministry (French Embassy in the United
States), excerpts of remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to
the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, 14 September 1981,





Before France could consider participating in comprehensive
talks it would be necessary for the two superpowers to have
already decided to reduce their nuclear weapons in such pro-
portion that the nature of the gap between their potential and
our own would have changed. And it would be necessary to have
achieved significant progress in eliminating the imbalance of
conventional forces inEurope.^'^'^
In consonance with this recognition of an enormous gap
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Assumes Le Tonnant will be withdrawn to meet refit Iwith M-47
date of 1987.
^^''France, Foreign Ministry (French Embassy in the United
States), excerpts of remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to
the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, 20 September 1982,
document 82/89 (New York: French Embassy Press and Information
Service, 1981 ) , p. 13.
108 Yost, p. 39.
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superpowers, the Mitterand government has dedicated itself to
maintaining the French deterrent. All the S-2, IRBMs, were
replaced with S-3s by 1982.109 And the first SSBN with MIRVed,
M-4, missiles L ' Infl exibl e , was launched in 1982 and put into
service during the summer of 1985.^1'^ Table 5, on the preceding
page, shows the current systems and their capabilities. Map 1,
on the following page, graphically depicts France's ability to
strike the Soviet Union.
The 1984-1 9 88 French Defense Programm e identifies what has
continued to be a driving concern behind French nuclear weapon
systems development throughout its history. "The credibility of
French Nuclear Force . . . based on the security of its operation
and on its capabilities of penetration and destruction. ...The
maintenance of its credibility presupposes, in[the] face of
advancing technology and threats, its continuous moderni zati on . "^2
In order to maintain a viable nuclear capability in the
future, the present government of France has committed France to
a protracted, across the board, upgrade of its nuclear
capability. Table VI depicts the multitude of programs currently
109" Sixth Nuclear Missile-Launching Submarine for Ile-Longue
Base," Le Monde, 3 April 1985, p. 10, cited in ForeignBroadcast
Information Servi ce--Western Europe ( F B I
S
) (4 April 1 985 ) : K3 .
ll^see Laird, p. 390; Mil itary Balance '84-'85, p. 130-137;
and "Sixth Sub," K3.
lll(See following page)
112prance, Ministry of Defence, The 1984-1988 French Defence
Programme (Paris: The Information and Public Relations Service









THE FRENCH FORCE DE FRAPPE
llljudy-Ann Carroll, "The French Nuclear Force and Arms
Control Negotiations" (Draft Seminar Paper, Naval Postgraduate
School, 1985), Appendix F.
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TABLE Vlll3
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ll^See Judy-Ann Carroll, "The French Nuclear Force and Arms
Control Negotiations" (Draft Seminar Paper, Naval Postgraduate
School, 1985), Appendix C; French Programme '84-'88 , pp. 9-10;
Robbin F. Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and 1990s,"
Comparative Strategy 4 (1984): 399; and David S. Yost, "France's
Deterrent Posture an d Security in Europe" (Draft of an Adelphi
Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985), pp. 39-45.
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underway, that, by the m1d-l99Qs, will provide France with a
greatly enhanced nuclear deterrent. The primary element of this
deterrent will remain the SSBN fleet, although the upgrade runs
the entire spectrum of France's force.
3 . Consistent Policy and Nuclear Program to Continue
By the time the mobile SX has been deployed, replacing
the venerable Mirage IV, France will have increased its
destructive capacity several fold. Table VII reflects the
dramatic increase in the number of warheads available today
versus those that are predicted to be available in the
mid-1990s.
TABLE VIlll^























* Assumes La Tonnant will be withdrawn to meet refit (with M - 4
)
date of 1987.
Assumes deployment of 100 SX and no MIRVing of S3s.
# Assumes Plutons will not be able to reload.
ll^See Laird, p. 406; Military Balance '84-'8 5, pp. 130-137;
and "Sixth Sub," K3.
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As for the future of French policy, security priorities
will not change; the "strategy" by which France seeks to attain
its security may be adjusted to accommodate changes in the inter-
national environment. Therefore, although France may
increasingly view itself as a more integral part of European
security than it did, say in 1966, the domestic requirement for
maintenance of a perception of independence in foreign and
military affairs will continue to provide some constraints on
this desire. ^15 Again, what underlies the shifts that have
occurred in French policy since 1966 is their continuing
reassessment of the threat. French perceptions of the threat,
whether a direct threat from the Soviet Union or an economic
and/or diplomatic threat from the United States, have oscillated
over the years since World War II, but these shifts have been,
and will continue to be, within the limitations of the domestic
constraints mentioned above.
C. BRITAIN
Although Britain's nuclear capability is not currently as
large as France's, the United Kingdom has a longer history as a
nuclear power. And there are other asymmetries between the two
nations' nuclear capabilities.
1 . The Development of British Nuclear Weapons and Its
Affects On Policy
Britain's relationship with the US on the subject of
nuclear weapons has been closer than any other nation. This
ll^shub, 2.
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close relationship has at times been at the expense of relations
with other US allies, particularly the French. The British
government had the potential of nuclear fission for weapons of
war brought to its attention initially by refugee German
scientists in 1939. l^^ This led to the establishment of a
scientific study group, known as the Maud Committee, which, as
early as 1940, concluded that such a weapon was feasible. ^^^ The
British set about researching the development of such a weapon.
The US sought to participate in the British effort, but was
limited to only the exchange of technical information. Owing to
fewer resources (i.e. scientific, technological, and material),
the positions were reversed by 1943 and it was not until the
Quebec Conference that Winston Churchill was able to obtain US
agreement to British collaboration on the Manhattan Project. As
a result of this collaboration the US ended the war with atomic
weapons and Britain with the technical knowledge from two years
of cooperative efforts. ^^^
Following the war, in 1946, the US Congress passed the
McMahon Act, which prohibited any such collaboration. Prime
Minister Clement At lee, who had sought continuation of such a
joint effort, then proceeded with the independent production of a
l^^Margret Cowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945
(London: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 33-42, cited by David N.
Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 26.
H^Gowing, pp. 45-89, cited in Schwarts, p. 26.
ll^Schwartz, pp. 26-27.
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British nuclear weapon. This effort resulted in Britain's
detonation of an atomic bomb in February 1952. This was followed
by the development, commencing in 1954, of a fuss ion device. On
15 May 1957, this resulted in Britain joining the thermonuclear
club. 119
Britain's initial impetus for development for nuclear
weapons was survival, another means of turning the tide of the
war against Nazi Germany. Subsequent to World War II, both
Labour and Conservative governments sought such weapons as
insurance against possible US retrenchment in the early post-war
years. Eventually, it was conceptualized and articulated in
Britain much earlier than in the US, that these weapons provided
a more viable deterrent than a large conventional force, at a
relatively inexpensive and affordable price. This was put forth
in a paper, "Global Strategy" by the British Chiefs of Staff in
1952. The policy was not implemented until after the Suez
crisis, following which both the army and navy were substantially
reduced . 120
The 1957 White Paper on Defense, by Minister of Defense
Duncan Sandys, called for British reliance upon thermonuclear
weapons, thus enabling a major reduction in conventional forces.
It also called for focusing development efforts on a long-range
ll^See William L. Langer, ed.. An Encyclopedia of World




ballistic missile. Another reason an indepenent British nuclear
capability was cited as desirable was the unreliability of the US
guarantee when only British vital interests were at stake (i.e.
the Suez oris is). ^21
To repair the rupture in Anglo-American relations. Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan met with President Eisenhower in March
195 7 in Bermuda. It was at this meeting that the US established
the precedent of providing Britain with nuclear delivery
vehicles. Although US motivation was multi-faceted, obtaining
forward basing for IRBMs capable of hitting the Soviet Union,
while sharing the cost and improving relations with Britain, so
were British motivations. The Thor, IRBM, was provided under a
dual key arrangement. In exchange for basing it in Britain,
Eisenhower committed himself to seeking amendments to the
MacMahon Act that would allow the British to have access to US
nuclear weapons technology data. This could help in development
of Britain's long-range ballistic missile, dubbed the Blue
Streak, which had been address in the Defense White Paper. It
also reestablished closer US-British ties.^^^
It is also at this time that close Anglo-American
relations begin to have a more significant impact upon
Anglo-French and French-American relations. France, also deeply
resentful over the US actions during the Suez crisis, saw the
Thor agreement as an additional slight to France. ^^^
1 21 lb id.
, p. 48, 60.
^22see Langer, p. 1173; and Schwartz, pp. 60-61
123schwartz, pp. 60-61.
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In spite of access to American technical data,
facilitated by a 1958 amendment to the McMahon Actl24^ Britain
cancelled development of its silo-based ballistic missile system.
Blue Streak, in April 1960. Prior to this announcement the
British had sought and obtained authorization to purchase an
American air-to-surface missile (ASM), Skybolt. This was
concluded in March 1960, at Camp David, by Prime Minister
Macmillan and President Eisenhower. The system was still in
development and therefore it was agreed either nation could
withdraw from the agreement, but the US would not cancel the
program without prior consultation with Britain. ^^^
Development of the system eventually failed because the
system would not be cost-effective to produce. The British had
been kept abreast of the systems fate, but its actual
cancellation, in November 1962 was leaked to the press before the
British government was able to address the subject publicly. It,
therefore, appeared the US had reneged on the arrangement. This
development placed Macmillan in an extremely tenuous position,
which President Kennedy recognized. During a previously
scheduled meeting, held in December 1962, in Nassau, Macmillan
made it clear the only solutian to his predicament was the US
Polaris missile. It was agreed by both that Britain would






withdrawable only "if 'supreme national interests' were at
stake". 126
The Nassau Agreement, while it further cemented Anglo-
American ties, signalled a near-break in French- American ties.
DeGaulle's action following the agreement may or may not have
been different, if such as agreement had not been concluded, but
failure to notify him prior to announcement of the agreement and
the offering of Polaris to France after the fact confirmed his
worst suspicions. He responded quickly. He rejected the offer
of Polaris missiles, refused to participate in any NATO- wide
nuclear force, and vetoed British entry into the EEC. 1^7
In spite of the diplomatic complications associated with
the Nassau Agreement, the Polaris, SLBM, provided Britain with a
strategic nuclear deterrent "on the cheap". This was important
because in Britain defense debates have repeatedly centered on
financing. Britain's failure to keep its military commitmeTfts
within limits its economy can support has been a continuing
problem. This accounts for the early attractiveness to the
British of nuclear weapons versus a large conventional
force (reflected in the 1952 paper, "Global Strategy", and the
1957 Defense White Paper, both mentioned above).
Polaris was delivered on time and at a lower cost than
programmed. Once in operation, its cost was less then 1% of the
126ibid,




defense budget during the 1970s. Unfortunately, this bred the
impression that the decision for Britain to remain a nuclear
power entailed no financial sacrifice. In contrast nuclear
development in France takes 20% of the defense budget on a
regular basis. ^^^
2 . Current Nuclear Policy and Capabilities
Although both maintain their own nuclear capability,
Britain, unlike France, is closely linked to NATO. As John Nott,
Secretary of State for Defense at the time stated:
It has been the policy of successive [British] Governments
to align our nuclear forces ever closer with NATO. Today, all
British nuclear forces, without exception, are assigned to the
Alliance . . .--this underlines our commitment to the nuclear
defense of NATO. ...While fully NATO-committed they are under
separate [British] control. ...The Soviets have to calculate
not only what the reaction of one nuclear power [the US] might
be if they attacked NATO» but of two nuclear powers. ^^^
The last point, however, clearly indicates that the
United Kingdom reserves to itself the final decision of where and
when its nuclear capability will be used. In consonance with
this, the British, like the French, "judge it unacceptable
that . . .[their] strategic forces should be included in . . .
negotiations. "^2^ They feel that having their forces included
with the US forces would undermine the premise their nuclear
capability is based upon.
^^^lavjrertce Freedman, "Britain: The First Ex-Nuclear
Power?" International Security 6 (Fall 1981): 84.
^29john Nott, "Decisions to Modernize UK's Nuclear




This premise was clearly stated in the preface to The
United Kingdom Trident Programme :
Deterrence ... is a matter of showing that the risks
involved in starting a war are seen by a potential aggressor as
far greater than any possible gains he could hope to achieve.
The striking power of our nuclear forces provides the risk of
appalling damage . . .--more damage than we believe any
rational being could regard as acceptable as the price to be
paid for military adventure .... And the presence of an
independent deterrent under the absolute control of the British
Prime Minister greatly multiplies the risk to any potential
aggressor of starting a war in Europe. ^-^^
The ability to deliver unacceptable damage to an
aggressor, independence of action, and yet close ties to
NATO--all touched upon in the passage above and repeatedly inter-
twined in British nuclear policy s tatenents- -are cited as the
need for a continued nuclear capability by the present
government. Britain has decided to meet this perceived need, in
the future, in much the same manner it established its current
capability. It is replacing its air delivery platforms, the
Vulcan, Buccaneer, and Jaguar, all European built, with the
strike variant of the Tornado, the GRl, an aircraft built jointly
by Britain, the FRG, and Italy. ^32 g^it the emphasis in upgrading
the nuclear capability has been aimed at the replacement for the
British SLBM, the Polaris. The British built their own SSBNs and
produced their own warheads, but purchased the launchers from the
US. They have recently modernized the system with the Chevaline
l-^^United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, The United Kingdom
Defence Programme
,
Defence Open Government Document 82/1 ( London
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1982), preface.
132Mott, 5.
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Project^ which should insure the systems viability into the
1990s, but the replacement for the entire system is to be the
Trident II (D-5). As with the Polaris system, the United Kingdom
will purchase the launchers from the United States, but produce
the submarine and warheads in Britain. The British "Government
bel i eves .. .the United Kingdom Trident submarines, and the Trident
II missile system, are the most cost-effective way of maintaining
well into the next century an effective independent strategic
nuclear deterrent force . . . ."133 so long as the current
government is in power it is highly unlikely there will be any
departure from the policy of replacing Polaris with Trident.
3 . The Future of British Policy
Although the main opposition party's platform has called
for unilateral nuclear disarmament and no US nuclear systems
based in Britain, since a party conference held in November
1980^34^ Labour did not succeed in ousting the present government
during national elections in 1983. A change in governments is
more likely to be the result of domestic discontent. If a Labour
government should come to power with a platform calling for
unilateral nuclear disarmament, it is not at all clear what the
result would be. Labour's platform in the October 1964 elections
called for the renunciation of Britain's independent Strategic
nuclear capability, but found reasons to reverse this position
1 3 ^Trident Programme
,
preface.
134p^eedman, "Ex-Nuclear Power," 99.
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once in power. It has been surmised that this was "the result of
cost considerations, domestic political liabilities, and a
stubborn bureaucracy. "^-^^ Similar constraints would be present
for any Labour government coming to power today. The same
nuclear disarmament forces present today were present in the
early-to-mid lQ60s. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude
that any Labour Government coming to power today would not
significantly change Britain's nuclear policy.
This probability is enhanced by the fact that the
majority of Britains' and the bulk of British political elite see
Britain's primary external ties now being associated with Europe.
In defense matters this means NATO is the focal point for British
policy. With respect to this, Britain's nuclear capability plays
a diachotomous role: dedicated to NATO, but under the sole
control of the British Government.
D. NATO'S VIEWPOINT ON INF
From NATO's viewpoint the INF deployment decision generally
strengthens deterrence for the following reasons: 1) US nuclear
forces in Europe provide a link to US strategic forces; 2) GLCMs
and Pershing lis are less vulnerable to attack than present
systems; 3) because the response is credible, the limitation of
war in Europe is more likely; 4) the new INF systems are not a
l^^Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British
Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970
,
( London: Oxford University Press, 19/2), pp. 283-292, cited by
David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1983 ) , pT 173.
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true first strike^ because GLCMs are too slow and the number of
Pershing lis being deployed are insufficient to be an effective
first strike. --^^ The actual deployments which started in
December 1983 signalled NATOs faith in its original decision.
The deployment indicated that, although the Western Alliance
is composed of democratic and sovereign nations which retain
their own prerogatives to question alliance decisions, a right
exercised extensively in the four year interval between decision
and deployment, the alliance remained committed and basically
united. The alliance was not going to undermine its own
defenses unilaterally. The USSR was going to have to conclude a





A. HISTORY IN EUROPE
The positions of the various nations involved in the INF
controversy have been addressed. Before attempting to sort out
these various positions on INF, we need to briefly review the
historical background of nuclear weapons in Europe, current
nuclear capabilities, and touch on projected improvements in
these capabilities by all parties.
Land-based nuclear missiles have been present in Europe for
well over thirty years. The Soviet Union first deployed R-1
rockets, an updated German V-2, with a range of approximately 300
km in the late 1940s or early 1950s. ^37 xhe US introduced the
Honest John, with a range of 40 km, in 1953. ^^^
The US introduced such weapons, in lieu of maintaining a
conventional force comparable to that of Soviet Union. But the
Soviet Union achieved superiority in IRBMs and MRBMs by at least
the early 1960s, if not before. This came about for a number of
reasons. First of all, it is clear that the US government knew
the Soviets would be left with a superiority in intermediate/
medium-range systems in Europe when it withdrew its IRBMs, the
Thor and Jupiter (in 1963) and its MRBMs, the Matador (in 1962),
^•^''Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The
Quest for Super i or ity (Washington , D. C . : Advanced International
Studies Institute, 1982), p. 13.
1
^
^Whence the Threat to Peace , p . 8
.
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the Redstone (in 1964), and the Mace (in 1966), 139 but was
relying upon strategic superiority as a counter capability.
Secondly, the Soviet Union during the 1957-1958 timeframe, decide
to deploy only a token number of their first generation ICBM, the
SS-6, because the guidance system was so rudimentary that it was
impractical. Instead the Soviets decided to put their major
effort into KRBMs and IRBMs. This would significantly enhance
their capabilities in Europe and Asia, where, among other things,
the US had its forward bases. ^^"^ For an overview of the history
of land-based ballistic and cruise missile deployments in Europe
see TABLE VIII, on the following page.^^^
B. CATEGORIES
Currently, there are many nuclear weapons systems in Europe.
Before one can begin to discuss the various systems, they must be
categorized. The following categories were selected: 1) long-
range, 2) intermediate-range, 3) medi um- range , and 4) short-
range. Although the last three of these categories are used in
The M i 1 i t a ry Balance , research for this analysis has failed to
identify a source with weapons compared in this manner. The term
139 Ibid
l^O^iller, pp. 50-54.
l^^See International Institute for Strateaic Studies,
Military Balance 1984-19 85 (The Al den Press, i984), pp. 133-134;
Miller, pp. 12-13; Whence the Threat to Peace , p . 8 ; United
States, Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985 , fourth
edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1985), p. 40; and Yost, pp. 39-45.
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TABLE VIII
THE EVOLUTION OF LAND-BASED BALLISTIC













































































SX 92-94 4.500 i
@ Jane's Yearbook 1984-1985 indicates some authorities believe
one version of the SS-20 has a range of 7^400 km, while the
Soviets maintain a capability 4,000-4,500 km. The 'standard'
found in essentially all analysis assign a range of 5,000 km.
* In Whence the Threat to Peace the Soviet Union contends the
Pershing II has a range of 2,500 km, but all the other sources
assign a range approximately equal to the 1,800 km cited in
Military Balance 1984-1985.
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"long-range" has been used in this analysis for the remaining
category^ instead of ICBM. The definition of "intercontinental"
may actually be appropriate for sone of the systems in the other
categories. At one time The M i 1 i t a ry Balance denoted distances
in miles, but now reflects them in kilometers. The only
significant difference found between the old and the new methods
is in the determination of what constitutes ICBM (long-range) and
intermediate-range. Under the old system, 4,000 miles was the
point at which something became classified as an ICBM
(long-range). Under the current system, 5,500 km (3355 miles) is
the point at which something is termed an ICBM (long-range)
weapon. The ranges used in this analysis are as follows: 1)
long-range (over 5500 km), 2) intermediate-range (2,400 to 5,499
km), 3) medium-range (800 to 2,399 km), and 4) short-range (less
than 800 km). All weapons have had this criterion applied to
them except submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Generally speaking, all SLBMs belonging to the United States and
the Soviet Union were included in SALT I and II. Therefore,
these weapon systems have been retained in the long-range
category regardless of their range. All aircraft are categorized
with a round-trip sortie with no refueling as an additional
criterion. Therefore, a bomber with a maximum unrefueled range
of 8,000 km would be classified with ballistic missiles with a
range of 4,000 km, an intermediate-range system.
Given these guidelines, the following groupings of weapons
systems were compared: 1) US versus USSR nuclear delivery
93
vehicles worldvn'de, 2) NATO (without US delivery systems) versus
The Warsaw Pact (without USSR delivery systems), and 3) NATO
versus The Warsaw Pact (considering only those nuclear delivery
systems deployed for use in Europe). See Appendices B, C, and D
for these detailed comparisons. For a quick overview of the
current nuclear capabilities in Europe and a concise synopsis of
the trends in the past decade, see Appendix E.
As for past, present, and projected IRBM, MBRM, and cruise
missile development and deployments in Europe, see Figure 3 on
the following page.^^^ Since Britain has no land-based missiles
of this type and because a significant portion of France's
nuclear capability are its SLBMs, these systems have been
included in this comparison also. But this should not be taken
to infer that these systems are to be included in INF
neqotiations or calculations.
I
^^^See Wynfred Joshua and Walter F. Hahn, Nuclear Politics
America, France, and Britain
,
The Center for Strategic Studies'
Washington Papers series, vol. 1, no. 9 (Beverly Hills,
California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1973), pp. 22-30; Laird,
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IX. PERCEPTIONS OF IMF CAPABILITIES
A. US/USSR NUCLEAR MIX
Having reviewed the multitude of nuclear systems each of the
major nuclear nations possess, the plethora of nuclear capable
delivery systems at the disposal of the two military blocs in
Europe, and the stated positions of all these actors, it is time
to resolve which systems to consider "equivalent" to which and
who's weapons should be counted against whom's. The
categorization that was applied in the preceding section goes a
long way towards achieving the first of these two objectives.
The range criteria outlined in that section appears
appropriate for determining, in general, what systems are
equivalent. Additional criteria within those constraints might
include limits on the number of nuclear warheads and megatonnage.
If one of the goals of all participants is to limit destruction,
then such parameters could begin to seriously address this
desire. The maintenance of each participant's national security
could be realized through modernization and innovation of the
many remaining variables.
It would be up to the discretion of each actor to determine
the mix of delivery systems that best met their needs {i.e. a
high proportion of sea-based versus land-based systems or vice
versa). Each nation would also decide whether to have numerous
launchers with single warheads or a smaller number of launchers






NATO GLCM AND PRSHING II COVERAGE
I'^^fjorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO and the Warsaw
Pact : Force Compa risons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, igeTTTp- 36.
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decision left to the individual nations is whether to rely upon
rapid response afforded by ballistic missiles (both sea and
ground based) or opt for the stealth qualities of cruise missiles
or new generation aircraft. Agreement on some of these concepts
has already been achieved^ either conclusively or tacitly (i.e.,
both sides have acknowledged future negotiations must take into
account the number of warheads; also the US's greater reliance
upon seaborne nuclear capability versus the USSR's land-based
preference). Rut numerous specific issues remain unresolved and
these vary somewhat between the different range levels.
B. US INF STRATEGIC?
One of the specific sticking points on INF negotiations is
whether or not GCLMs and Pershing lis are strategic systems. The
Soviets contend they are because they can strike the Soviet Union
proper from where they are deployed; see Map 2 on the preceding
page. The West counters that the systems are merely intended to
interdict the second echelon capability of the Warsaw Pact/USSR
in the event of an attack against NATO. The primary targets
being C3 and transportation centers and links. ^^^ Both arguments
suffer when viewed from the perspective of the status quo ante.
NATO has had nuclear capable delivery vehicles that could
strike the Soviet Union since the late 1950s. If the sole
criteria for a system being classified as strategic is its
ability to deliver a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union from
I'^'^Werner Kal tef 1 ei ter , "Structural Problems in
Negotiations: A View From Europe," In Arms Control: Myth Versus
R e a 1 i ty , ed. Richard F. Starr (Sta nf ord , C a 1 i f o r n i a : Hoover
Ins ti tut ion Press, 1984), p. 124.
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where it is deployed, why then did the Soviet Union, which is
renowned for its tenacity in negotiations,^*^^ sign two Strategic
Arms Limitations Treaties without all such systems being
included? The reason lies in the fact that the Soviets had their
own intermediate and medium-range systems, which also were not
included in the agreements, with which they could counter such
systems. They also knew that they were all but ready to deploy a
new generation of such systems that would provide them with
superiority in this catego ry.^^^ Therefore, this particular
aspect of their argument against the two systems raises questions
about the Soviet Union's motivation. Is theirs a desire for
security or superiority? The GLCMs and Pershing lis are clearly
in a similar category as previous intermediate and medium-range
systems.
As for the West's argument that they pose only a threat to C3
and transportation centers and links, the systems do have the
range to strike beyond the area of a second echelon. The West
already possessed systems that could reach to the depth of second
echelon elements. The systems were clearly a response to the
threat posed by the new Soviet INF systems, such as the SS-20,
the SS-22, and the Backfire bomber. All of these systems could
be employed from the Soviet Union against the farthest reaches of
^^^See Eugene V. Rostow, "The Russians' Nuclear Gambit,"
Atlantic Commun ity Quarterly 22 (Spring 1984): 36; Edward L.
Rowny, "Negotiating with the Russians," Atlantic Community
Quarterly 18 (Fall 1980): 301; and Starr, p. xii.
l^^see Holloway, pp. 69-70; Miller, p. 233; and Soviet
Mi 1 ita ry Power ' 8 5, p . 40.
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the Western Alliance and the only real counter available to the
West was the US central systems . ^''^^ This was unacceptable to the
West and incongruent with flexible response. The systems are not
strategic in the sense they should be calculated against ICBMs,
but warrant separate agreements placing limits on both sides'
quantity, thereby establishing some parameters at this level.
C. US INF A FIRST STRIKE?
A second thorny issue is whether these two systems (GLCMs and
Pershing lis) pose a first strike capability. Again, the stated
positions of both sides bears questioning. The Soviet Union
contends that because these weapons can be employed against their
strategic systems (ICBMs and C3 centers), ^^^ they are de facto
first strike systems. The West argues that the GLCMs are too
slow and the Pershing lis too few in number to provide a first
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The Soviets' argument, that the sole criteria that makes a
system a first strike instrument is its capability to strike
strategic systems, suffers under analysis, much as their argument
concerning the strategic nature of these same systems. The
Soviet Backfire bomber has the range to hit strategic targets in
the US without refueling if forward recovered, ^^^ but it is
unlikely to be employed in such a manner. The Soviets have
other, better suited, systems for this purpose and the Backfire
was developed for other purposes. The new US INF systems in
Europe are also unlikely to be employed as a first strike.
The GLCMs, although they fly at low altitudes, are slow and,
therefore, would be in flight for several hours before being able
to strike Soviet strategic systems. ^^^ The longer flight time to
such targets would significantly increase the possibility of
detection. And, since they remain within the earth's atmosphere
on a more or less level trajectory for the entire flight, they
are subject to all the air defense countermeasures available to
the Soviets. 1^2 As for the Pershing lis, although having an
extremely short flight time, 8-10 minutes by Soviet est
i
mates, ^^^
they are deployed in too small a number to destroy a significant
amount of the Soviet strategic capability, thereby accomplishing
a crushing first strike alone .
1
5
Q soviet Military Power ' 8 5 , p . 8 5
.
l^^See Bertram, 309; and NATO Force Comparison
, p. 30.
152Ronald T. Pretty, ed., Jane's Weapon Systems 1984-1985
(London: Jane's Publishing C ompany Limited, 1984), p. 79 , 81
.
l^-^Whence the Th reat to Peace



















The eventual total of 108 Pershing lis could only reasonably
be employed for a credible first strike in combination with US
central systems (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and B-52s), which is highly
unlikely and something the Soviets would probably detect through
heightened readiness. However, such a short flight time could
make launch on warning retaliations highly improbable, if not
impossible for those Soviet systems targeted by Pershing lis in
such a scenario. Therefore, of the two systems, the Pershing II
is the only one a plausible case could be made for "first strike
capability". A negotiated, phased reduction by both sides, with
the West agreeing to have their initial reductions to come in
this weapon system, is worth consideration. But any such
agreement would have to entail agreed upon reductions in those
Soviet systems, particularly the SS-20, which threaten all of
Western Europe, even from locations east of the Urals, as shown
on Map 3 on preceding page.
The new US INF systems should not then be classified with
strategic weapons unless a multitude of systems, not previously
addressed as strategic are also included. Also the GLCMs pose no
first strike threat in the traditional sense of a rapid, hard to
impede weapons system. The Pershing II, on the other hand,
although unlikely to be employed in a first strike, has the quick
strike time and the hard to stop, high trajecto ry of
intercontinental systems. In a treaty that would achieve
"balanced levels "155 between the US and the Soviet Union within
155ThTs is not the same thing the Soviets are speaking of
when they talk about "eoual" reductions. With a numerical
advantage the Soviets would like to see such reductions. It
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MAP 4.156
TARGET AREAS OF THE SS-20, PERSHING II AND GLCM
would actually increase their force ratio (i.e. if ratio of
weapons was 9 to 6 and both sides reduced by 3, the Soviets would
go from a force level one and a half times the size of the US to
one twice the size, or 6 to 3). The US should accept only
agreements that reduce the levels of each jto the same equivalent
or "balanced le vel .
"
l^^NATO Force Comparison, p. 37.
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i nterniedi ate/medi um- range weapon systems, it would be appropriate
to eliminate these weapons first.
D. SS-20 STRATEGIC?
A question that has not received nearly as much attention as
the one concerning the first strike/strategic potential of the US
GLCMs and Pershing lis is the question of the SS-20's strategic
potential. From where they are currently stationed in the
eastern USSR (in the vicinity of Mongolia), they can strike a'
significant portion of Alaska. ^^^ This is pictorially shown on
the preceding page; see Map 4. These systems are mobile and,
therefore, could readily be deployed to the far eastern or even
the Arctic regions of the USSR, from which all of Alaska and a
sizeable portion of the Pacific Northwest would be within the
range of the SS-20. Additionally, a vast amount of the
literature in the West, concerning the SS-20, ascribes to the
conclusion that it is a two stage version of the three stage
SS-16, ICBM.l^^ Some analysts argue that "with relatively simple
technology, the SS-20 could be converted into an SS-16
missile".^^^ But, in all fairness, the question is essentially
the same for this weapon as the GLCMs and Pershing lis. If it is
to be classified as strategic simply because it can strike a
1575ge NATO Force Comparison




^^^See Jane's '84- '85 , the "Strategic Weapon Systems section
on the USSR, p. 8; Kalte fie iter, p. 66; Miller, p. 233.
159Kal tefl eiter, p. 67.
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portion of the US, other systems, not currently listed as
strategic, would have to be included (i.e., Tomahawk cruise
missiles) .
The prima ry difference here is that the SS-20 flirts, much
more closely than any other current system, with the fine line
between long-range and intermediate-range. But this is to be
expected of the Soviets. That does not mean it should not be
addressed either through agreement or through development of
comparable weapons. The Pershing II deployed in a European
theater, although a medium-range system, may be a functionally
comparable system.
E. INCLUDE FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS?
The last remaining sticking point is the question of which
nations' systems should be included in European INF agreements.
The Soviets have become more and more adamant about this. The
French and British positions are clear--they will not consent.
The US has agreed in the past to consider these forces, but in
another forum, outside the INF negot i a ti ons . ^^^
Should the US then reconsider the inclusion of these systems
in its count? NO! The Soviets have employed the same arguments
before. In the SALT I Interim Agreement, although there was no
explicit recognition within the document, the Soviets were
allowed 2,347 strategic systems to the US's 1,710. Many say the
disparity included more than just compensation for the US's lead
160st arr
, p . x-xi
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in MIRVed warheads, that it was tacit' recognition of the French
and British systems.^^^
The Soviets continued to seek formal recognition and
numerical compensation for these forces in SALT II-. But in the
Vladivostok Agreement the Soviets agreed with the US "to the
principle of equal numerical ceilings . . . of 2,400 launchers
for each side [the US and the USSR], of which 1,320 could be
MIRVed." This concept was essentially retained in SALT II. ^^^
The Soviets now seek to equate the French and British systems
with the SS-20. But, during the mid-1960s when the SS-20's
development was initiated^^-^, the Soviets did not consider these
systems "in a position to change the balance of power in the
world. "1^^ Also, the French and British systems currently under
development, which the Soviets would now like to link the SS-20
to^^^, were not even in the development stages in the mid-1960s.
Therefore, the SS-20 should not be thought of as a response to
these new French and British systems, which is contrary to the
popular notion the Soviets now like to foster--that their weapons
l^lKal tefl eiter, pp. 64-65.
162Yost, p. 271.
l^^see Holloway, pp. 69-70; Miller, p. 233; Soviet Mi 1 ita ry
Power '85
, p. 40.
l^^Nekrasov, " Contra ry to the Times and Good Sense," Pravde ,
19 January 1963, cited in Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Nuclear
Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy," r b i s 14 (Summer
1970): 322.
165Yevgenyev and Aleximov, 59.
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developments are merely in respo.nse to Western i ni ti ati ves . ^^^
The SS-20, like many other Soviet weapons developments, v;as a
display of Soviet initiative rather than reaction. 1^^
The Soviets also use the subject to try and sev/ further
dissension amongst the alliance members. They do not demand that
the French and British systems be reduced, but that at least
their numbers be included in the US's count. But the bulk of the
French and practically all the British nuclear capability lies in
their SLBM's. These SLBM's are essentially the same as Soviet
and US systems--considered in the SALT negotiations as
"strategic." Also, seldom more than half of such systems are
ever readily available and they are not easily reloaded. The
Soviets wish to compare them to the SS-20, all of which are
^
^
^ Whence the Threat to Peace
, p . 7 .
^^^Contra ry to the popular misconcept
like to perpetuate, the Soviets have ofte
development. The Soviets were the first
ballistic missiles [the R-1, first test f
1949/50]. They developed intercontinental
SS-6, first tested in 1953/54, deployed i
the first deliverable thermonuclear devic
were the first to develope and launch SLB
launched in the 1954/55 timeframe and dep
recently the Soviets were the first to te
weapons. Like these innovations, the SS-
modifi cation of the SS-16 or a separate d
prompted by similar measures in the West,
development in approximately 1965. Altho
originally intended as a replacement for
Soviets clearly intended to produce a mob
IRBM/MRBM capabiity, as evidenced by the
the mid-1960s of the SS-15 and SS-14. Th
on the SS-13. Their failure coincided wi
of the initial development of the SS-16.
Miller, p. 233; and Soviet Military Power
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readily available and quickly reloaded.^^^ There are a number of
other reasons v/hy these systems should remain outside bilateral
negotiations between the Soviets and the US on INF:^^^
1) No clear cut precedent for counting third party systems.
2) France and Britain refuse to be a party to such negotiations
until US and Soviet nuclear force levels are reduced to
French and British force levels.
3) The US does not control British and French forces.
4) French and British forces are central systems established
to provide a deterrent for the two nations and are not
conceivably going to pose a unilateral launch threat to
Soviets. "Soviet spokesmen concede that [these] nuclear
forces do not constitute a significant military threat to
the Soviet Union. . . ."170
5) Only the US central systems provide the ultimate deterrent
to the Soviets and the only credible linkage to those
systems are the US's INF systems.
6) If the French and British nuclear forces were included in an
elimination of all European INF systems, it would leave the
Soviets with mobile "Asian" INF assets that could be
employed against Western Europe.
7) Acceding to the Soviet proposal for French and British
inclusion would be tantamount to accepting Soviet authority
for nuclear superiority. Surrendering to the Soviet demand
for global "parity" with the US and regional "parity" with
France and Britain (with the US having no European INF)
actually amounts to giving the USSR the rioht to absolute
superiority over each nation individually. ^71
The US should not include British and French nucler forces in
its count in a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union. The
168Yost, pp. 272-273.
169i5id, pp. 273-2 76.
l^ORostow, p. 37.
171pi erre Lellouche, "France and the Euromissiles: The
Limits of Immunity," Foreign Affairs 62 (Winter 1983-84): 330.
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French and British clearly are not going to be a party to any
multilateral negotiatins on nuclear weapons until there are
drastic reductions in the nuclear capabilities of the two
superpowers. And there is no rational reason for the Soviets to
feel threatened by French and British nuclear forces. No nation
with a few of hundred nuclear weapons is going to launch a
preemptive attack against a nation with well over 10,000 nuclear
weapons .
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X. CONCLUSION: THE NATIONAL INTERESTS IMVOLVED IN IMF
,
A RETROSPECTIVE
This study has attempted to show the INF controversy as a
manifestation of the confluence of foreign and domestic interests
of the United States, the Soviet Union, and a multitude of West
European states. The analysis has considered: 1) the basic
concepts or precepts that strongly influence, if not determine, a
state's national interests, 2) what the perspectives, needs and
positions are of the various states involved in the INF
controversy, 3) (where it is pertinent) the evolution of those
positions, 4) how, in the case of some states involved in the INF
controversy, the national interests are significantly impacted by
domestic considerations, 5) the history of nuclear capabilities
in Europe, and 6) the capabilities of the INF systems in question
and how they fit within the context of the overall nuclear
capabilities of the various states involved. Given what has been
revealed in this investigation, it would seem that a negotiated
settlement of the INF controversy could clearly improve the
external environment for the states involved. Such a settlement
could reduce the level of anxiety for all. It would enhance the
stability of West European governments and, thereby, their ability
to address other issues. It would significantly detract from the
perception that the US was aggressive in its conduct in the
world, particularly with the Soviet Union. This, in turn, would
provide the leaders of these states with greater latitude and
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domestic support to stand behind other US initiates, that they
may be in favor of» throughou t . the world.
Unf rtunately » the US (that is the media and, therefore, the
bulk of the public) expects too much from arms control. Eugene
Rostow assesses it this way:
Throughout the West, many well-intentioned people insist
in believing that the impasse in Geneva nuclear arms
negotiations is based on mutual misunderstanding .... The
Soviet leaders are not crude peasants who need a little
reassurance about how well-intentioned the US really is. They
understand the difference between Soviet and American foreign
policy very well indeed.^^^
The US would, therefore, be foolish and actually endanger NATO's
short term credibility and the long term stability of Western
Europe, as we now know it, if it capitulated to Soviet demands on
INF. The intensity of the controversy, as it is seen by each of
the actors, is assessed using Nuechterlein's national interest
matrix;seeTableIX.
For NATO as a whole and France, Britain and the INF site
countries specifically, the INF controversy is a vital issue with
respect to their defense interests. This accounts for the stance
of the various government leaders on INF, in spite of domestic
opposition. The threat posed by Soviet European INF capabilities
is both highly credible and excessively massive. At various
times (i.e., the Soviet walkout of the INF negotiations in
November-December 1983) the threat has even appeared almost
imminent. This is precisely the effect the Soviets have sought.
^^^Ros tow
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but not with the intention of sparking a counter build-up.
Instead they sought the acquiescence of Western Europe to Soviet
d on i n a n c e
.
The US and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are not as
seriously threatened by the INF issue; for them it is a major
interest. In spite of the Soviet rhetoric about the seriousness
of the threat posed to the Soviet homeland by the US INF deployed
in Europe, the Soviets know its limitations and that their
ability to retaliate against the US is more than sufficient to
deter a US first strike. They also know the US is a status quo
power. The Soviets merely sought to expand their influence in
^^^Nuechterlein, p. 75.
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Western Europe and reduce the US's through modernization of their
sub-strategic nuclear capabilities. For the US, although of a
higher order of importance, because of the Soviet INF's ability
to devastate Western Europe, INF capability is a factor to be
either negotiated away or countered in kind. Failure on the US's
part to do either would enable the Soviets to achieve, fait
accompli, the equivalence of the nuclear capability of all the
other nations in the world. This would then pose a more serious
defense problem for the US; a threat at the vital issue level.
The INF controversy does not pose any direct or immediate
impact on the economic well-being of the states, but the
potential, long-term impact is significant. If INF led to a
realignment of Western Europe away from the US and towards the
Soviet Union, it would greatly enhance Soviet access to Western
Europe's economic wealth and its products (i.e., technology). It
would reduce US markets and in the long run could reduce Western
Europe's ability to be competitive in the world's economic arena.
As far as a favorable world-order is concerned, it is much
more crucial for the West to maintain the status quo, than it is
for the Soviet Union to expand its control. The present
structure is the one in which both Western Europe and the US can
feel more secure. It also provides an excellent framework for
them to operate within in the international setting. For the
Soviet Union the status quo does not reduce their security, but a
realignment by Western Europe would enahnce it.
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The INF controversy is not specifically about the values
either side holds dearest. To a degree, the protection of those
values are involved as long as there is any level of threat to a
state's sovereignty, but that is not what the controversy hinges
upon. However, a resolution of the controversy in the Soviet's
favor, rather than something mutually beneficial, would enhance
the Soviet influence in Western Europe. This, in turn, could
eventually lead to an abridgment of Western values (i.e.,
censorship of the press, either by the government or
self-censorship of the items that would be viewed unfavorably by
the Soviet Union).
The US should seek a negotiated settlement, but should not
view an agreement as an end in itself. The goal is a reduction
in INF weapons or at least parameters upon them. If that cannot
be realized, the present status of Western Europe, between the US
and the USSR, has not been weakened by the course of the INF
controversy to date. All indications are that the bonds between
the West European governments and the United States today are
much stronger than they were in the late 1970s, a time when the
tide of European confidence in American leadership of the
alliance was at a low ebb.
Lawrence Freedman, in The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
,
made the following observation about NATO's December 1979 "twin-
track" decision: "The feature of the decision that aroused the
most satisfaction was that it had been made at all, given the
domestic political difficulties it caused in a number of member
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states . . . ."174 This is clearly the concensus of a diverse
West European perspective. The US view would be similar, while
the Soviet viewpoint would be more, one of frustration. Repeated
attempts, by several Soviet leaders over the past six years, have
failed to dissuade the alliance members involved from honoring
their obligations to this decision. This domestic discontent
became even more marked during the past six years in some of the
states in question. But that discontent has subsided somewhat,
but by no means disappeared, in each state, after deployment has
actually been effected.
Recent Soviet proposals still contain many of the same
disproportionate or inequitable aspects as previous proposals,
however there may be some encouraging aspects. The Soviets have
offered to negotiate with the French and British separately.
They have agreed in principle to substantial reductions in long-
range/strategic systems. They have offered to negotiate a
separate US/USSR bilateral agreement on European INF systems.
NATO's December 1979 decision and the tenacity of the member
states involved has been seen as credible enough to cause the
Soviets to display some movement (although much less than it
would appear in the media). This has been accomplished by
keeping in mind that the goal of their collective security is a
Western alliance that poses a credible deterrent. If the process
leads to a truly equitable and verifiable agreement on INF
l^^Lawrence Freedman, The E vol u ti on of Nuclear Power (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981 ) , p. 386.
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systems, then these systems may have helped to bring about the
ultimate goal of most people, a true reduction in the nuclear
threat to all. If not, then a viable, credible deterrent will,
at least for the time being, maintain the status quo in Europe








Defense Interest : the protection of the nation-state and its
citizens from the threat of physical violence by another country,
and/or protection from an externally inspired threat to the
national political system.
Economic Interest : the enhancement of the nation-state's
economic well-being in relations with other states.
World-order Interest : the maintenance of an international
p 1 i t i c a 1 and economic system in which the nation-state can feel
secure and in which its citizens and commerce can operate
peacefully outside their own borders.
Ideological Interest : the protection and furtherance of a set of
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Peripheral Issues : The well-being of the state is not adversely
affected by events or trends abroad, but the interests of private
citizens and companies operating in foreign countries are
endangered. Obviously, the large and powerful multinational
corporations are usually given a higher priority by the parent
count ry since their earnings and taxes have a significant effect
on the economic well-being of the home state. Each nation-state
makes its own determinatin on how greatly it values commercial
enterprises operating abroad: for some, these companies
constitute major issues of national interest; for others, they
are only of peripheral importance.
Sentimental Attachm ent
because of cul tural
Ame ri cans
.
the support given certain countries
links and strong ethnic ties felt by many
National Prestige : a nebulous concept, but leaders of great
powers are acutely aware of the impact that their decisions in




Type of Government : has to do with the ideological issue in
foreign policy --whether the regime asking for help is democratic
or authoritarian, whether it has regard for human rights and the
d i g n i ty f t h e i n d i V i d u a 1 .
Risk of Protracted Conflict: determined largely by assessing
enemy's willingness to resist military pressure, and it is
crucial to all other cost/risk factors.
the
Risk of Enlarged Conflict : refers to the possibility that other
powers might become involved in a local conflict and thereby
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NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES COMPARISON
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Tomahawk USA 1983; 32
SUBTOTAL 32
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Pershing' SS-4 USSR 1959; 224
II USA 1983; 48 SS-12 USSR 1969 >
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TOTAL 48 TOTAL 314
AIR AIR
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FB-111 A USA 1969; 56 TU-22 USSR 1962; @
SUBTOTAL 56 SUBTOTAL @
[©-number included in intermediate range bomber total]
(Land-based Strike) (Land-based Strike)
F-104 FRG,Gr,Ne, SU-17 USSR 1974; 800
It,Tur 1958 281 SU-20 Poland 1974; 35
F-4 E USA 1962; 96 SU-24 USSR 1974; 600
F-4 E/F FRG, Tur 67-73 131
F-111 E/F USA 1967 150
F-16 USA 1979 72
F-16 Bel, Den, Ne, Nor 1982 178
Buccaneer Br 1962
, 25
Mirage IVA Fr 1964 28
Mirage HIE Fr 1964
.
30
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A-7 USA 1966; 48
SUBTOTAL 48+*
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NATO WARSAW PACT
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LAND
(SRBM)
Pershing lA USA 1976; 60
Pershing lA FRG 1962; 72
Lance USA 1972; 36
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TRENDS IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 179
(1975-1985)
DELIVERY VEHICLES NUCLEAR WARHEADS 1
CATEGORY
type (RANGE)
1975 1985 1975 1985 1




155-240mm (14-29) 700 700 600 1400 1400 1200
Lance (110) 36 90 216 810
FROG/
SS-21 (0-120) 662 691 1324 1382
Honest John (40) 200 24 2000 240
Sergeant (140) 20 200
Fr. Pluton (120) 12 42 12 42
Scud/
SS-23 (300-350) 384 539 768 1078




1250 1500 375 637
Fr. Carrier-based
Aircraft (1500) 24 24









30 70 30 70
Carrier -based
Aircraft (Varies 86 72 122 108
Bombers (Varies) 85 100 170 75 170 208 340 200
French
Mirage IV (3200) 36 33 36 33





II (1600) 108 108
SS-12/
SS-22 (1000) 85 85 170 170
SUBTOTAL 1204 1885 1400 1710 1808 1653 2079 1108 1
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See Uwe Nerlich, ed. , Soviet Power and Western Nej^otiating
Policies
. vol. 1: The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the
Competition Over Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bal linger
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